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Article
Contracts on the Seabed
Christiana Ochoa †
“This mining, when it occurs, is going to be just massive in scale. It probably will
have the largest footprint of any single human activity on the planet.” 1
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INTRODUCTION
The ocean is, by all accounts, largely unexplored and very poorly
understood. The only way to change that, according to the experts devoted to the
pursuit of oceanic knowledge, is to “get down there and do it” 2 by exploring,
charting and cataloguing the earth’s last frontier. To this end, the United States
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is conducting research on as much of
the ocean’s floor as it can—an area about the size of West Virginia each year—
as quickly as it is able. West Virginia, though, is small compared with the ocean. 3
Expeditions to explore and map the ocean floor share one feature: the
novelty of what scientists are finding. A few examples of these unexpected finds
include a “tar lily” found in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2014, 4 creatures that
make their home exclusively at the 438°F mouth of hydrothermal vents, the
“Pogo squid” that uses a narwhal-like horn to hop along the ocean floor, 5 a fortyfoot-long bioluminescent pyrosome that looks like a giant aquatic tube, 6 and a
wide variety of other previously unseen creatures. 7
It is widely acknowledged that we know very little about the topography,
geology, ecology or zoology of the oceans. What we do know, in fact, is that we
are vastly ignorant about the contents and the floor of the oceans. With respect
2.
Rebecca Jabson, See The Strange Creatures NOAA Found at the Bottom of the Sea, PBS
NEWSHOUR (May 14, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/coral-forests-rare-sea-stars-inhabitunseen-ocean-floor/.
3.
Id. While the entire ocean floor has been mapped to account for features that are larger than
five kilometers across or larger, only 10-15% of the ocean floor has been mapped to a resolution that can
detect features as small as 100 meters across, and only 0.05% of the ocean has been explored sufficiently
to be able to detect objects that are the size of a shipwreck or mineral spires. This leaves the ocean floor
significantly less well mapped than the surface of Mars, the Moon or Venus. See John Copley, Just How
Little Do We Know about the Ocean Floor?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/just-how-little-do-we-know-about-the-ocean-floor/; see also,
Sen Nag, Oishimaya, How Much of the Ocean Have We Explored?, WORLDATLAS (Aug. 27, 2018),
worldatlas.com/articles/how-much-of-the-ocean-is-still-unexplored.html.
4.
Lisa Stelzner, An Unexpected Discovery of Tar Lilies in the Gulf of Mexico, DAILY DOSE
OF SCIENCE BLOG (May 6, 2014), http://lisastelzner.weebly.com/daily-dose-of-science-blog/anunexpected-discovery-of-tar-lilies-in-the-gulf-of-mexico. See also, Exploration of the Gulf of Mexico
2014 Daily Updates, Dive 12: Tar Lilies, NOAA OCEAN EXPLORATION AND.RESEARCH.(Apr..24,.2014).
5.
Jabson, supra note 2, discussing the “tar lily,” hydrothermal vent creatures, the “pogo
squid,” and other unique finds.
6.
Kristy Hamilton, Giant, Tubular Creature Caught On Camera Under The Sea, IFLSCIENCE
(Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.iflscience.com/plants-and-animals/giant-tubular-creature-under-sea.
7.
See, e.g., MasakhaneSA, Aliens of the Deep & Mission to Europa, YOUTUBE (Sep. 15,
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1MkyPWIl1H4 (last visited Dec 11, 2019).
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to understanding what exists at the bottom of the ocean, or how ecosystems
operate there, “the area that has been ‘explored’ is arguably even less than the
0.05% mapped so far at the highest resolution by sonar,” 8 because seeing an area
just once, by sonar, does not approximate an actual understanding of any given
marine zone. 9
Given the scientific community’s paucity of knowledge concerning deepsea ecosystems, the proposed processes for extracting deep sea minerals, and the
well-documented impacts of traditional mining operations, the environmental
impacts of such projects will almost certainly be significant, even if
unpredictable. Although many risks remain unknown and unknowable, a number
of inherent dangers are evident in the proposed processes for extraction. The
immediate impacts of such operations that involve scraping the seafloor and
releasing sediment plumes also include potential fuel leaks, and noise and light
pollution. 10
Because the nuances of deep-sea ecosystems remain largely unknown, it is
impossible to adequately assess the risks of deep-sea mining or to design
appropriate measures to protect sea life. Without more information, many
scientists and environmental advocates argue that “robust risk mitigation is not
possible.” 11
The debate over seabed mining is further complicated by conflicting
opinions on the best course of action in the face of climate change. Although the
Global North has contributed the vast majority of historic CO2 emissions, it is
undisputed that the Global South will bear the brunt of the changing climate’s
most immediate and devastating impacts. 12 The situation is particularly dire for
small island nations. 13 Absent substantial technology and funding support from
developed nations, many developing nations will be left to mitigate and adapt to
the harms of a changing climate without the necessary infrastructure or financial
resources. 14 This situation exerts enormous pressure on the most vulnerable
countries to develop at a rapid rate.
Opinions also diverge as to whether the seabed mining industry will
8.
Copley, supra note 3.
9.
Even the Census of Marine Life, which describes itself as “the most comprehensive
inventory of marine life ever compiled and catalogued” was the result of only 540 expeditions. This
project resulted in a finding of over 6000 potential new species. About the Census | Census of Marine
Life, CENSUS OF MARINE LIFE (2010), http://www.coml.org/about-census.
10. Kathryn Miller, et. al., An Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State of
Development, Environmental Impacts, and Knowledge Gaps. 4 FRONT. MAR. SCI. 418; (2018). See also,
Wil S. Hylton, History’s Largest Mining Operation is About to Begin: It’s Underwater—and the
Consequences are Unimaginable, THE ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2020).
11. Luisa Casson, et. al. In Deep Water: The Emerging Threat of Deep Sea Mining,
GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL 3 (2019), https://storage.googleapis.com/planet4-internationalstateless/2019/06/f223a588-in-deep-water-greenpeace-deep-sea-mining-2019.pdf.
12. See Glenn Althor, et. al., Global Mismatch between Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the
Burden of Climate Change, 6:20281 SCIENTIFIC REPORTS (2015).
13. See Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific: Links, Attitudes, and Future Scenarios in
Nauru, Tuvalu, and Kiribati, UNITED NATIONS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
(2015),
https://www.unescap.org/resources/climate-change-and-migration-pacific-linksattitudes-and-future-scenarios-nauru-tuvalu-and.
14. See Mizan Khan, et. al., Twenty-five Years of Adaptation Finance Through a Climate Justice
Lens, CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2019).
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produce a net benefit or harm to global efforts to stop dangerous emissions. 15 On
the one hand, many proponents of seabed mining argue that, with onshore mines
quickly depleting, the seabed is believed to have large stores of the minerals
needed to create the batteries for electric vehicles and solar panels necessary for
a global transition to renewable energy systems. 16 Indeed, this is exactly how
seabed mining company representatives refer to the importance of seabed
mining, stating, for example, that “in the oil and gas sector, now almost all the
new discoveries are at sea,” and that “minerals are likely to go the same way.” 17
However, there is significant concern that, as the mining operations break
up sediment, they will disrupt the ocean’s important function as a carbon sink,
releasing stored carbon back into the atmosphere and canceling out any benefits
the mined materials might have provided. 18 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change reports that “ninety-two percent of the carbon on Earth that is
not locked up in geological reserves (e.g., in sedimentary rocks or coal, oil and
gas reservoirs) resides in the ocean.” 19 Additionally, the toll of climate change
(e.g. increased water temperatures and salinity) to ecosystems in the Pacific, and
on the human communities that depend on these ecosystems, demands serious
consideration. 20 In this context of a generalized and well-acknowledged dearth
of information, global interest in seabed mining is surging. While the existence
of these mineral and rare earth deposits has been known since the 1960s, the
technology to access them was so distant that mining these valuable deposits
seemed impossible. This is rapidly changing, however. Ship-based surveys of
the seafloor have traversed large swaths of the South Pacific 21 and extraction
machinery is starting to roll off production floors. 22
Indeed, Nautilus Minerals, the company running the world’s first licensed
seafloor mining operation, announced in January 2016 that it had taken delivery
of three fully operational seafloor production tools which are being tested for the
commencement of mining in the immediate future. 23 Mining enterprises are

15. See Nathanial Gronewold, Seabed-Mining Foes Press U.N. to Weigh Climate Impacts, E&E
NEWS (July 16, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/seabed-mining-foes-press-u-n-toweigh-climate-impacts/.
16. Id.
17. Harvey Cook, Director, Bismarck Mining Corporation (Vanuatu) Limited (Part of Neptune
Minerals Group), Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation
Conference hosted by the Vanuatu National Offshore Minerals Committee, Port Vila, Vanuatu (October
7-9, 2014) (notes on file with the author).
18. Casson, supra note 11, at 3.
19. Nerile Abram, et. al., The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate: Summary for
Policymakers, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 1-10 (2019).
20. Id. at SPM-9.
21. Presentation of the Minerals Section of Geology, Mines, and Water Resources, Government
of Vanuatu, Photo of SOPAC Mining Survey Cruises, Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy
Consultation Conference (October 7-9, 2014) (photo on file with the author).
22. Taylor Heyman, Nautilus Minerals Unveils its Titanic Deep Sea Mining Machines, MINING
TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.mining-technology.com/features/featurenautilus-mineralsunveils-its-titanic-deep-sea-mining-machines-4739435/ (noting that “deep sea mining pioneer Nautilus
Minerals has revealed the three mighty machines it plans to use to scrape valuable deposits from the
seafloor”).
23. Deep Sea Mining Machines, USGS, https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/deep-sea-miningmachines (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).
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currently in hot pursuit of these potentially lucrative deposits. The first deep-sea
mining project—the Solwara 1 Project in Papua New Guinea 24—was slated to
serve as a prototype for many to follow until the project, meeting community
opposition, was terminated due to contractual and financing complications
resulting in Nautilus’s bankruptcy 25 and termination from the Toronto Stock
Exchange. 26 The implosion of Nautilus 27 was further complicated by its violation
of contractual agreements with the Papua New Guinea government. 28 At the time
Nautilus filed for bankruptcy in Canada, the Papua New Guinea government held
a fifteen percent stake in the abandoned Solwara 1 project and equipment, and is
now facing nearly $24 million in debt, 29 further illustrating the need for
comprehensive contracts that can meet the basic requirements for good seabed
mining governance and thus shield governments that lack robust mining
regulations from the unstable nature of the industry.
Innovations in machinery have reduced the barriers to entry for other
seabed mining companies in other target locations. For example, Japanese Oil,
Gas and Minerals National Corporation “has successfully deployed excavators
to extract seabed soils rich in zinc, gold, copper and lead from depths of 1,600m
in waters close to Okinawa within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Japan.” 30
DeepGreen, a Canadian company, portrays itself as targeting “a sustainable
future—with less environmental and social impact.” 31
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) “establishes specific policies and
approves applications for exploration and exploitation rights.” 32 Its activities
24. The Solwara 1 Project, operated by Nautilus Minerals, was a prototype at the exploration
stage, as well. See Satya N. Nandan, Offshore Mining: International, Exclusive Economic Zones and
Territorial Waters—An International Perspective, MINERAL LAW SERIES no. 2 (2005) at 16E-10 (stating
that the first exploration license had been granted by Papua New Guinea to Nautilus). This is the project
from which Solwara 1 developed.
25. The Production Support Vessel Nautilus was depending on for the Solwara 1 project was
nearly 75% complete when a financier failed to make its 3rd payment on the construction of the vessel in
late
2018.
See
Status
of
Equipment,
NAUTILUS
MINERALS,
http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/status-of-the-equipment.aspx?RID=424. This resulted in
slow unraveling for the Nautilus project, and for Nautilus itself. See Ben Doherty, Collapse of PNG DeepSea Mining Venture Sparks Call for Moratorium, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/collapse-of-png-deep-sea-mining-venture-sparks-callsfor-moratorium. See also In the Matter of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act [2019] B.C.S.C.
No. S191827 (ordering Nautilus into bankruptcy), https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/car/nautilus-minerals/
assets/nautilus-minerals-057_081319-a.pdf; Report on Nautilus Minerals, PWC (Nov. 21, 2019) (stating
that PWC has “proceeded to file the relevant documents to assign Nautilus Minerals Inc. into
bankruptcy”).
26. Nautilus Delisted from Toronto Exchange, PAPUA NEW GUINEA POST-COURIER (Apr. 2,
2019), https://postcourier.com.pg/nautilus-delisted-toronto-exchange/.
27. Amanda Stutt, Nautilus Minerals Officially Sinks, Shares Still Trading, MINING.COM (Nov.
26, 2019), https://www.mining.com/nautilus-minerals-officially-sinks-shares-still-trading/#:~:text=
Nautilus%20Minerals%2C%20one%20of%20the,Canadian%20Court%20in%20February%202019 and
David Shukman, Agreement Reached on Deep Sea Mining, BBC (April 25, 2014)
http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/3366/ (describing the agreement between Nautilus and
Papua New Guinea).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Casson, supra note 11, at 6.
31. About Us, DEEPGREEN, https://deep.green/company/.
32. The International Seabed Authority, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY,
https://www.isa.org.jm/documents/authority-brochure. The ISA is composed of 168 member states from
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govern the seabed that lies beyond any zone of national jurisdiction, 33 which is
nearly 50 percent of the Earth. The ISA has been preparing for its role as a seabed
license-grantor since it was established by the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea 34 and has been increasingly active since the Law of the
Sea Convention was enacted in 1994. 35 The ISA’s main activities include
creating regulations for each of the types of currently known mineral deposits on
the ocean floor, 36 including creating a process of license applications and
approvals. 37 Among the important functions of the ISA is approving “15-year
plans of work in the form of contracts, in which governmental and private entities
spell out the [exploration and exploitation] activities they intend to conduct in
precisely defined geographic areas assigned to them.” 38 The ISA is actively
receiving petitions for, and issuing exploration licenses to, state-owned and
private companies (such as UK Seabed Resources Ltd, a Lockheed Martin
Subsidiary) 39 from Brazil, India, Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and a
which 36 representatives are elected to serve on the Council. The Council selects experts with scientific,
legal and mining expertise to serve on the Legal and Technical Commission (LTC). The LTC is charged
with much of the most substantive work of the ISA, drafting regulations, reviewing applications for
mining exploration and exploitation, and monitoring companies with respect to compliance with
environmental rules. Much of the substantive work of the LTC, such as mineral “finds” and environmental
impact assessments are kept confidential within the LTC. See Todd Woody, Seabed Mining: the 30 People
Who Could Decide the Fate of the Deep Ocean, OCEANS DEEPLY (Sep. 6, 2017),
https://www.newsdeeply.com/oceans/articles/2017/09/06/seabed-mining-the-24-people-who-coulddecide-the-fate-of-the-deep-ocean.
33. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S.397 (hereinafter “UNCLOS”); see also Nandan, supra note 24.
34. UNCLOS, art. 1.
35. See Delegates Handbook 2019, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, https://rans3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-public/files/documents/2019delegatehandbook.pdf. See also
Nandan, supra note 26, at 16E-3.
36. The Mining Code, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, https://www.isa.org.jm/miningcode/Regulations.
37. Id. Importantly, the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS (the treaty authorizing the
creation of the ISA). Rather, the Unites States regulates its activities in the high seas through the Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401-1473 (1980), 15 CFR § 970. NOAA has issued
four licenses for deep sea exploration in the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone. Deep Seabed Mining:
Approval of Extension and Revision of Exploration License, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,631 (Aug. 5, 2002) (Deep
Seabed Mining Exploration License USA-1 extended through 2004); Deep Seabed Mining; Lapse of
Exploration License, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,631 (July 1, 1999) (Deep Seabed Mining Exploration Licenses
USA-2 & 3 lapsed in 1997 and 1999); Deep Seabed Mining; Issuance of Exploration License, 59 Fed.
Reg. 66,942 (Dec. 28, 1994) (Deep Seabed Mining Exploration License USA-4 issued to Ocean Minerals
Company). See Review of U.S. Ocean and Coastal Law: The Evolution of Ocean Governance Over Three
Decades,
U.S.
COMMISSION
ON
OCEAN
POLICY,
Appendix
6
in
AN
OCEAN.BLUEPRINT.FOR.THE.21ST.CENTURY at n.14 (2004), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancom
mission/documents/full_color_rpt/append_6.pdf. On September 7, 2017, NOAA announced the approval
of the five-year extension of Deep Seabed Mining Exploration License USA-1 and Deep Seabed Mining
Exploration License USA-4, filed by Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC). Deep Seabed Mining:
Approval of Exploration License Extensions, 82 Fed. Reg. 42327 (Sep. 7, 2017),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/09/07/2017-18994/deep-seabed-mining-approval-ofexploration-license-extensions. Today, two exploration licenses remain in effect, both held by LMC. See
R. Kerry Kehoe, NOAA and Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Exploration and Recovery, NOAA OFFICE FOR
COASTAL MANAGEMENT at slide 5, https://rnrf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/KerryKehoe
Presentation.pdf.
38. Nandan, supra note 24, at 16E-4 (citing to the Agreement Relating to the Implementation
of the Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 1982, A/RES/48/263,
Annex, § 3 para. 11(a)).
39. Casson, supra note 11 (providing a listing of the governments and contractors that have been
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host of others. 40 As of mid-2019, the ISA has issued thirty 15-year exploration
contracts 41 and it is estimated that roughly 1.2 million square kilometers are now
under various mineral prospecting permits. 42 This is roughly equivalent to twice
the entire water area of the United States. 43
The picture of seabed mining and the role of law in this activity go far
beyond the ISA and non-territorial waters. Much of the territory deemed most
desirable—both because of mineral content and the relative ease of accessing the
resource and nearby land from which to stage operations—exists within the
territorial waters, the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) or the extended
continental shelf areas of a large number of countries. 44 Individual countries
exercise sovereign jurisdiction over their marine environments, airspace, and the
bed and soil of their territorial waters. 45 In addition, these jurisdictions enjoy
sovereign rights to the living and nonliving resources contained in their EEZs, 46
and sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting the natural resources found in
their own claimed continental shelf areas. 47
Consequently, the work of the ISA, which systematizes and stabilizes the
regulatory regime relating to the exploration and exploitation of the minerals
found outside any nation’s jurisdiction, is largely irrelevant to a large portion of
potential seabed mining and exploration activity. Instead, there is great
variability with respect to the regulatory frameworks addressing seabed
exploration and mining among the world’s coastal countries.
Some countries have developed regulatory structures that clearly indicate
participation from the scientific and legal communities. From existing models,
one can piece together that current and future seabed mining regulation should
meet the following core governance objectives. A stable regulatory structure
must: i) balance environmental protection with the desire for economic growth, 48
granted contracts for deep sea mining exploration within the Area, by largest area).
40. Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors, ISA, https://www.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed-mineralscontractors. See also David Shukman, Deep Sea Mining Licences Issued, BBC NEWS (July 23, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28442640.
41. Id. (“Eighteen of these contracts are for exploration for polymetallic nodules in the ClarionClipperton Fracture Zone (16), Central Indian Ocean Basin (1) and Western Pacific Ocean (1). There are
seven contracts for exploration for polymetallic sulphides in the South West Indian Ridge, Central Indian
Ridge and the Mid-Atlantic Ridge and five contracts for exploration for cobalt-rich crusts in the Western
Pacific Ocean.”).
42. Shukman, supra note 40.
43. Geography Statistics of United States of America, WORLDATLAS,
https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/namerica/usstates/uslandst.htm.
44. Deep Sea Minerals: Summary Highlights, SECRETARIAT OF THE PACIFIC COMMUNITYEUROPEAN UNION, https://dsm.gsd.spc.int/public/files/meetings/TrainingWorkshop4/UNEP_summary.pdf.
45. UNCLOS, art. 2, para. 1-3. See also UNCLOS, art. 33 (defining the “Contiguous Zone,”
which provides a nation the right to assert its sovereign enforcement rights over matters related to customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws that apply in its territory or in its territorial waters).
46. UNCLOS, art. 56, para. 1 (decreeing that within the EEZ, a state has “Sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, whether living and
nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds”). See also What is the EEZ?, NOAA (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/eez.html.
47. UNCLOS, art. 77-78, 81.
48. See Charles Douglas Oliver, Interim Deep Seabed Mining Legislation: An International
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create a stable and predictable set of rights and obligations between the parties, 49
and establish reasonable mechanisms for objective dispute resolution; 50 ii)
include a robust community consultation/consent process and recognize the
valuable contributions of each party; 51 iii) ensure high revenue streams for the
government and, ultimately, for the benefit of the people it serves; 52 and iv)
embed the best knowledge available regarding ecological management and
conservation. 53 These governance objectives will be further discussed in this
Article. 54
While clearly in need of improvement and updating, 55 the United States
has a relatively developed regulatory structure. Through its National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, the United States has developed a regulatory
framework that has thus far impeded sea-based mining enterprises from
establishing operations within its territorial waters or the United States’ EEZ and
continental shelf. 56 Australia has similarly adopted a regulatory approach that
has thus far prohibited sea-based mining activity. 57 Large economic powers such
as Australia and the United States have a high level of legal capacity and also
significant experience with regulating land-based mining. Therefore, governing
seabed mining, while posing novel challenges and uncertainties, has not been
entirely unfamiliar. 58
Environmental Perspective, 8 J. LEGIS. 73 (1981) (detailing the importance of environmental protection
in seabed legislation).
49. See generally, e.g., Model Law on Mining on Community Land in Africa, INTERNATIONAL
ALLIANCE ON NATURAL RESOURCES IN AFRICA, http://eacsof.net/EACSOF/2016/08/22/model-law-onmining-on-community-land-in-africa/.
50. Id. at 55-58.
51. Id. at 13-29.
52. See James D. Friedland, Under the Territorial Sea: Reforming U.S. Mining Law for Earth’s
Final Frontier, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1548, 1598-1599 (2014) (arguing that revenues from sea-based mining
must be substantial in order to fund government objectives and to offset inevitable environmental harms).
53. Id.
54. See infra Section IV.B.
55. For an exposition of U.S. regulations for the issuance of offshore mineral mining leases and
an evaluation of potential improvements to the current regulatory structure, and particularly a discussion
of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, see generally Friedland, supra note 52. See also 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2006); 15 CFR § 970.100; Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1473 (2002).
56. According to a representative of the Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management (BOEM),
over the past 10 years, BOEM has issued one “prospecting permit for exploration of marine minerals in
the Alaska OCS Region” but none for phosphate, manganese nodules, C4 sulfides or cobalt-rich crust.
See email from Sara B. McPherson to Margaret Kiel-Morse (Jan. 15, 2020) (on file with author).
57. See State of the Environment, Marine Mining and Industry, COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA (2016), https://soe.environment.gov.au/theme/marine-environment/topic/2016/marinemining-and-industry.
58. New Zealand, also familiar with land-based mining, placed a moratorium on exploration
and mining in coastal waters off the Northern Territory from 2012-2015. See Interim Report: Seabed
Mining in the Northern Territory, NORTHERN TERRITORY EPA, app. At 74 (Mar. 6, 2012),
https://ntepa.nt.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/284910/Seabed-Mining-Report.pdf. In 2015, the New
Zealand Environmental Protection Agency approved an application by Trans-Tasman to mine iron sands
near Patea, New Zealand. See Valentina Ruiz Leotaud, Seabed Mining Approved in New Zealand Despite
Environmentalists’ Concerns (August 17, 2017), https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/aboutboem/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Leasing-and-Plans/Leasing/Alaska-Detailed-Listing-of-ActiveLeases.pdf. This license has been the subject of legal battles since 2018 when the High Court of New
Zealand found the original license was inappropriately granted. An appeal of that decision began in
September 2019 and is stiffly opposed by local environmental and fishing groups. See Appeal Begins Over
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Quite another legal, regulatory, and economic story prevails in many other
countries, however. Many coastal countries, particularly Pacific Island nations,
are scrambling to enact legislation quickly enough to deal with oil, gas, and
mineral operations at sea. 59 These countries have neither significant prior
experience with the mining sector nor the legal, technical, and administrative
capacity to adequately regulate seabed mining, which is, at once, both potentially
lucrative and potentially ruinous. On the one hand, seabed mining has the
potential to provide much-needed economic revenue to countries whose landbased natural resources are not substantial. Mineral resource extraction, if well
managed, has the potential to establish revenue streams that could finance health,
education, and infrastructure investments in these countries. However, as with
land-based natural resources, these potential revenues must be both realized and
well managed if their exploitation is to assist in financing such social and
economic projects. On the other hand, beyond the revenue management
questions so prevalent in the literature pertaining to land-based natural resources,
a variety of novel and unknown environmental and social issues also arise.
In the case of countries whose land-based natural resources have not been
previously exploited on a significant scale, the environmental and social issues
will be particularly noteworthy. The social and environmental impacts of mining
have the potential to be significantly more harmful than any other activity with
which these countries have first-hand experience. In the case of countries that
have traditionally relied heavily on their marine territory and EEZ for economic
benefits from fishing or for other aspects of their well-being, such as a basic
relationship to a healthy ocean, the potential impacts from seabed mining may
be particularly pronounced. Unfortunately, these countries’ historic inexperience
with mining also means that their regulatory structure is significantly
underdeveloped. There is little prospect for developing the technical or legal
innovations and capacity necessary to prepare these countries to adequately
regulate seabed exploration and exploitation, such that they can achieve the goal
of maximizing the potential benefits of mining while minimizing potential
harms.
This Article will focus mainly on one such country—the Republic of
Vanuatu—which serves as an example of the current situation of Pacific Island
nations. Vanuatu offers a compelling case study of the role that contracts must
play in creating strong frameworks for seabed mining activity.
Vanuatu’s relative lack of experience with the mining sector, weak legal
infrastructure regulating mining, and lack of access to the financial resources
necessary to rapidly buttress this legal infrastructure reveals a regulatory lacuna
that is common to many of the countries being targeted by seabed mining
companies for access to the natural resources within their control. Thus, while
Seabed Mining for Ironsands off Taranaki Coast, STUFF.COM (Sep. 25, 2019),
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/116015151/appeal-begins-over-seabed-mining-for-ironsands-offtaranaki-coast.
59. Richard Johnson, Manager of EEZ Applications, New Zealand EPA, Presentation at
Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference hosted by the Vanuatu
National Offshore Minerals Committee, Port Vila, Vanuatu (Oct. 7-9, 2014) (notes on file with the
author).
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Vanuatu is unique— with its particular legal structure, experience with mining,
culture, and national objectives—it serves as an apt example of a country in
which contracts can play an essential role in filling regulatory gaps. Like in other
countries with thin regulatory structures, the contract between the government
of Vanuatu and the companies applying for permission to explore for (and, later,
to exploit) natural resources can supplement or create conditions and constraints
on the companies’ activities, establish adequate revenue-sharing, and require
accountability and responsibility for both the anticipated and unanticipated
environmental and social impacts of seabed mining.
In the context of novel activity such as seabed mining, contracts offer other
highly desirable characteristics. In comparison to statute-based governance
approaches, contracts offer relative mutability, flexibility, and nimbleness. They
allow for innovative governance strategies that incorporate the evolving and
deepening knowledge about the environmental value of the ocean and its
contents as well as the environmental and social costs of mining its floor.
Contracts are thus well-suited to translating governance theories into applied
realities governing contracting parties’ behaviors and their relationships to one
another. In this way, and in this novel context, contracts are better equipped to
create enforceable regimes around concepts such as free, prior and informed
consultation/consent (FPIC);60 the precautionary principle;61 adaptive management;62
and an approach to commercial relations that is structured around ecological and
human well-being rather than around economic growth. 63 This Article argues
that particularly because what is most known about the ocean is that much is still
unknown, these features of contracts are especially desirable.
60. Free, prior and informed consent (or consultation) “requires actors to solicit and obtain the
consent of indigenous communities prior to undertaking projects that may impact their territories or
resources.” Julian Aguon & Julie Hunter, Second Wave Due Diligence: The Case for Incorporating Free,
Prior, and Informed Consent into the Deep Sea Mining Regulatory Scheme, 38 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3
(2018). “Free” requires that consent be freely given without duress, “prior” necessitates that the consent
be received before the operation begins, and “informed” means full disclosure of information regarding
all aspects of a proposed project or activity in a manner that is accessible and understandable to the people
whose consent is being sought.” Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), EARTHWORKS (2019),
https://earthworks.org/issues/fpic/.
61. The precautionary principle requires that “‘when an activity raises threats of harm to human
health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically’ . . . [there are] four central components of the
principle: taking preventative action in the face of uncertainty; shifting the burden of proof to the
proponents of an activity; exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions; and
increasing public participation in decision making.” David Kriebel, et. Al., The Precautionary Principle
in Environmental Science, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 871, 871 (2001) (quoting and citing
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
(C. Raffensperger & J. Tickner, eds., Island Press 1999)).
62. “Adaptive management is a systemic approach for improving resource management by
learning from management outcomes . . . An adaptive approach involves exploring alternative ways to
meet management objectives, predicting outcomes of alternatives based on the current state of knowledge,
implementing one or more of these alternatives, monitoring to learn about the impacts of management
actions, and then using the results to update knowledge and adjust management actions.” BYRON K.
WILLIAMS, ET. AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL
GUIDE (2009).
63. These are concepts that emerged during Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy
Consultation Conference as essential to any consent that may be given through an FPIC process. See
generally photos of conference wrap-up posters in which participants in the conference described their
then-current thinking about seabed mining in Vanuatu’s waters (on file with author).
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Almost all countries have some form of mining law, and in some countries
the primary source of obligations will be found in legislation and a set of mining
regulations. In these systems, companies establish their operations through
licenses to mine particular geographic space and the licenses are subject to all
relevant legislation and regulations, including environmental management,
royalties, etc. 64 Very few countries rely exclusively on contracts for regulating
mining investments, but many countries with mining laws continue to employ
contracts to establish the terms of the relationship between the state and the
company. 65 Generally speaking, the same obligations can ensue, whether
established through legislation or though contracts. Among the benefits of
legislation and regulation is the higher likelihood, historically, that the law is
publicly available and that there might have been some opportunity for public
notice and comment as the laws were being formed. In addition, violations of the
law can result in state-imposed civil or criminal penalties, which may serve as
more effective incentives for compliance. However, in locations where the
mining laws have not yet been fully developed, particularly with respect to
seabed mining, contracts must fill the regulatory void left by sparse public law.
In relation to novel commercial activity, such as seabed mining, contracts can
also serve additional useful functions as discussed herein.
To establish some necessary background, Part I provides additional
information about seabed mining, offering a brief history and discussing the
locations where this activity is commencing. In doing so, Part I will provide some
detail of the mining industry’s interest in marine territory within the ISA’s
jurisdiction as well as its interest in territory that lies within the jurisdiction of
individual countries. Part II then focuses on this second category—marine
territory that is subject to the jurisdiction of individual countries. In doing so,
Part II distinguishes between countries that (largely due to experience and preexisting capacity) have taken relatively strong regulatory approaches and those
that have not yet done so. Part III provides additional detail about the Republic
of Vanuatu, a country that has not yet adopted a strong regulatory structure. Part
III will describe Vanuatu’s experience to date with the mining industry’s interest
in its territorial waters and EEZ. It describes how mining companies became
involved in Vanuatu, as well as the growing interest in Vanuatu’s evolving
approach to seabed mining activity. This background brings into strong relief the
pressing need for the additional protections for Vanuatu’s government, people
and environment if mining activity is to move forward. Given that statutory
approaches have been slow and sparse, the contracts between the government
and the mining companies could serve as a governance mechanism born of
necessity. Part IV discusses how a contract must and can serve a necessary
regulatory role in such situations. It describes key contractual provisions that are
essential for contracts to serve this stopgap function. Part IV also discusses the
role of contracts in this context where global ignorance prevails—both about the
activity and about the environment in which it will occur. Part IV will provide
64. Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them, NATURAL RESOURCE
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE 36, https://eiti.org/document/mining-contract-how-to-read-understand-them.
65. Id. at 35.
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examples of contractual provisions that can incorporate evolving information
about the ocean and about seabed mining on the one hand, and novel governance
approaches that may be difficult or impossible to build into statute-based
regulatory approaches on the other. The Article concludes by providing concrete
suggestions for contractual innovations for countries contemplating seabed
mining. Regardless of whether contracts serve stopgap functions, innovating
functions, or both, many countries moving forward with seabed mining will be
well served by closely investigating the terms on which they issue licenses for
seabed prospecting and exploitation.
I. EXPERIMENTAL SEABED EXPLORATION AND MINING
A. A Brief History of Seabed Exploration and Mining
Phosphorite nodules were first discovered on the seabed in 1873 by the
crew of the HMS Challenger, 66 the ship that acted “as a floating lab for the
world’s first large-scale oceanographic expedition, circumnavigating the globe
and dredging up samples of never-before-seen creatures from the ocean floor.” 67
During the early part of the 20th century, manganese nodules, seafloor massive
sulfides, and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts were also identified and studied
by scientific voyages. Starting in the second half of the 20th century, the mineral
content of these geologic features, which contain copper, zinc, gold, silver,
manganese, cobalt, molybdenum, and rare earth elements, began to draw
significant attention. 68 From 1978 to 1979, a seabed exploration company used
another ship, the Hughes Glomar Explorer, to extract polymetallic nodules from
the seafloor. 69
Until recently, two factors have impeded the commercial viability of
mining the seabed: 1) sufficient accessible land-based mineral deposits that have
led to relatively low market prices and 2) insufficient technology and machinery
to access and mine the seabed. Both of these factors have begun to shift. For each
of the past five years, the Deep Sea Mining Summit has evidenced growing and

66. THE GEOLOGY OF CONTINENTAL MARGINS, 650 (C.A. Burk & C.L. Drake eds., 1974),
https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Geology_of_Continental_Margins.html?id=vqLyCAAAQBAJ.
67. Kate Golembiewski, H.M.S. Challenger: Humanity’s First Real Glimpse of the Deep
Oceans: The story of one of the most important expeditions in history, DISCOVER (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.discovermagazine.com/planet-earth/hms-challenger-humanitys-first-real-glimpse-of-thedeep-oceans.
68. Deep Sea Minerals: Summary Highlights, supra note 44, at 3.
69. Mineral resources of the deep seabed. Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, first[-second]
session, on S. 1134.1 at 383 (1973). The history of the Hughes Glomar Explorer is itself fascinating. The
ship was built by the CIA to extract the wrecked Soviet ballistic missile nuclear submarine from its final
resting place three miles below the surface of the Pacific Ocean. As a cover story for this highly-visible
endeavor, “[f]rom about 1970-74, the CIA managed to convince the world that billionaire inventor
Howard Hughes had decided to invest millions to mine ‘manganese nodules,’ balls of heavy metals that
lie on the ocean floor. Via fake press releases, events, technical specs and front companies, the CIA
convinced the world that Hughes was leading a new ocean-mining rush.” See Julia Barton, Confirmed:
The CIA’s Most Famous Ship Headed for the Scrapyard, THE WORLD (Sep. 7, 2015),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-09-07/ship-built-cias-most-audacious-cold-war-mission-now-headedscrapyard.
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intensifying global interest in mining the ocean’s floor. 70 The description for the
2020 event states:
As we move into an era of mining the deep-ocean floor, the world’s most remote
environment, mining companies are working on overcoming the perceived
challenges and developing island nations are watching with interest. As the demand
for base metals and minerals surges ever beyond what our land is able to provide,
new technological and technical developments are helping to drive forward this new
industry. 71

The result is that interest in mining both within sovereign marine territory
and in the Area beyond it has increased. As stated above, the ISA is actively
engaged in issuing prospecting licenses to enterprises from a large number of
countries, and at least three companies (DeepGreen, 72 Nautilus Minerals 73 and
Neptune Minerals Group 74) have made significant investments in seabed mining
within the territory of coastal nations.
The regulatory regime governing the Area or the “High Seas” differs from
the regulatory regime governing the sovereign seabed of each coastal nation.
Before moving on in Part II to discussing the general development of national
regulatory developments with respect to seabed mining, the following section
will briefly describe the regulatory regime governing the Area.
B. International Waters
The high seas have always been the earth’s great common space, covering
more than seventy percent of the earth’s surface. The customary law of the high
seas and the absence of regulation were the predominant paradigms 75 until the
emergence of the concept of EEZs, and the 1994 entry into force of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). 76
UNCLOS was signed in 1982 and entered into force in 1994. 77 Part XI of
70. THE DEEP SEA MINING SUMMIT 2020, http://deepsea-mining-summit.com/.
71. Id.
72. Sponsoring States, DEEPGREEN, https://deep.green/sponsoring-states/.
73. NAUTILUS
MINERALS,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200225201116/http://www.
nautilusminerals.com/IRM/content/default.aspx. Nautilus has filed for bankruptcy, as executed by
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Nautilus Minerals Inc., PWC CANADA (Nov. 21 2019), https://www.pwc.com/
ca/nautilus-minerals. An internet search for Nautilus Minerals directs web users to the website of Deep
Sea Mining Finance, which describes itself as “a privately owned group aiming to become the first in the
world to mine Seafloor Massive Sulphide (“SMS”) deposits commercially, starting with its high grade
copper-gold Solwara 1 project (“Solwara 1”) in the territorial waters of Papua New Guinea (“PNG”).
DSMF is a joint venture between international holding group “USM Holdings Limited” and Sultanate of
Oman group “MB Holding Company LLC.” See DEEP SEA MINING FINANCE, https://dsmf.im/.
74. Tenements, NEPTUNE MINERALS - DEEP OCEAN MINERALS EXPLORATION AND RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.neptuneminerals.com/our-business/tenements.
75. Notable exceptions would include the laws pertaining to ship seizures under the laws of war,
prohibitions on piracy on the high seas, and the international agreements to regulate slave trading vessels.
For an excellent account of the laws regulating slave trading ships, see Jenny Martinez, Antislavery Courts
and the Dawn of International Human Rights, 117 YALE L.J. 550 (2007). For a more general account of
the treatment of ships under customary international law, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner,
Understanding the Resemblance between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA.
J. INT’L L. 639, 641-51 (2000).
76. UNCLOS, supra note 33.
77. As of February 9, 2020, the UNCLOS had 157 signatories and 168 parties. Status of United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION DEPOSITARY.
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the UNCLOS, and the 1994 Implementation Agreement relating to Part XI,
establish the legal framework for seabed mining and scientific research in the
Area. The general principle that the High Seas are the common heritage of
mankind is imbedded in UNCLOS, including in the sections pertaining to seabed
minerals. For example, it sets out explicitly that the resources in the Area pertain
to mankind, all activity carried out in the Area must benefit mankind as a whole,
including equitable allocation of economic gains, and may only be recovered and
sold under the rules established by UNCLOS and the ISA. 78
UNCLOS, Article 145, requires the protection and conservation of the
Area’s natural resources and the protection of the marine environment and, in
other sections, charges states party with the preservation of the marine
environment, including requiring that each state party develop domestic rules
regarding pollution from seabed activities. 79 In addition, Article 146 requires that
“necessary measures shall be taken to ensure the effective protection of human
life” with respect to activities in the Area. 80
UNCLOS also establishes the rules governing payments and contributions
in kind that must be made by states party, or companies sponsored by states party,
with respect to revenue from the exploitation of nonliving resources in the
Area. 81 UNCLOS and its attendant documents also lend attention to disputes
arising from activities in the Area and the settlement of those disputes. 82 The
Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
established under UNCLOS, Annex VI, serves as the primary body for the
settlement of seabed disputes. UNCLOS, Annex VII and Annex VIII also
anticipate that states parties will submit conflicts to arbitration and establish
basic rules for those proceedings.
UNCLOS, which includes 320 Articles, in addition to nine annexes, an
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI (governing the Area), a
number of recommendations, a model contract, and a set of standard clauses for
exploration contracts, establishes at least the beginning of a regulatory
framework for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the Area
and establishes institutions to implement these documents.
The chief regulatory body established under UNCLOS is the ISA, which
was established with the entry into force of UNCLOS. Each of the 168 states
parties to UNCLOS 83 are members of the ISA. Within the ISA, the Council is
the ISA’s executive body. “It establishes specific policies and approves
applications for exploration or exploitation rights. It has the power to oversee
implementation of seabed provisions of the Convention and the Implementing
Agreement.” 84
Since its establishment, the ISA has developed regulations on prospecting
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

UNCLOS, arts.133–43.
Id. at arts. 145, 192, 194, 195, 208, 209.
Id. at art. 146.
Id. at art. 82.
Id. at part XV.
Status of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 77.
The International Seabed Authority, supra note 32.

2021]

Contracts on the Seabed

117

and exploration of polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides, and cobalt-rich
ferromanganese crusts. These regulations govern the applications to the ISA by
states party, or companies sponsored by states party, for 15-year contracts
granting exclusive rights to explore delineated tracts of seabed within the Area.
II. NATIONAL TERRITORIES
A. National Territorial Waters, EEZs, and Extended Continental Shelf
Territories
The development of exclusive economic zones and the potential for coastal
states to extend sovereign rights into extended continental shelf territories has
greatly limited the space previously governed by the law of the high seas:
“roughly 35 percent of ocean space is part of the exclusive economic zones
claimed by coastal states today.” 85
Article 3 of UNCLOS establishes that the territorial sea of each continental
nation extends for 12 nautical miles into the sea, measured from baselines 86
determined according to the Convention. 87 Each coastal state is also entitled to
establish an exclusive economic zone that extends 200 nautical miles into the sea
from those same baselines. 88 Coastal nations enjoy “sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or nonliving, of the waters superjacent to the seabed
and of the seabed and its subsoil.” 89 Finally, coastal nations may, under Article
76(5), register a claim and exercise sovereign rights over the exploration and
exploitation of natural resources over an extended continental shelf region of up
to 350 nautical miles from the baselines. 90 The part of the ocean that does not
fall into any of these three sovereign claims is defined as the Area, over which
the ISA has regulatory jurisdiction, as described above.
As Figure 1 above illustrates, a large amount of the mineral and rare earth
wealth on the floor of the Pacific Ocean lies within the sovereign territorial seas,
EEZs, and continental shelf regions of individual countries. It is well beyond the
scope of this paper to survey the variety of legal and regulatory structures present
in each of the world’s 152 coastal nations. It is worth noting, however, that
coastal nations’ regulatory structures with respect to prospecting, exploration,
and mining vary considerably. Moreover, because the domestic rules that govern
mineral exploration and mining, to the extent they exist, were developed to
address land-based mining, they are predictably inapt in the context of seabed
mining. Few coastal countries have, until recently, developed legal or regulatory
structures to address this activity.

85. THOMAS DUX, SPECIALLY PROTECTED MARINE AREAS IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONE (EEZ): THE REGIME FOR THE PROTECTION OF SPECIFIC AREAS OF THE EEZ FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
REASONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2011).
86. UNCLOS, art. 3.
87. Id. at arts. 2–16.
88. Id. at art. 57.
89. Id. at art. 56.
90. Id. at art. 76(5).
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B. Governments with Stronger Regulatory and Administrative
Frameworks
In countries with established land-based mining economies, existing and
adaptable regulatory frameworks may render contracts less necessary, since
environmental protection, taxation, royalty rates, and other concerns may be
addressed through legislation and regulation. However, even in these locations,
contracts may be used to fill gaps in the application of regulations, to deviate
from non-mandatory public law or in order to bring governments already familiar
with land-based mining into compliance with the requirements of good
governance in seabed mining. The following case studies, although each
displaying varying statutory achievements and shortcomings, provide a
backdrop against which to compare countries where existing mining legislation
must be supplemented by contracts in order to effectuate basic environmental,
commercial, and social aims. Each of the countries highlighted in Part II.B
demonstrates that legislation for seabed mining can and should include structures
of accountability in order to be effective. As stated in the Introduction, such
structures should i) balance environmental protection with the desire for
economic growth 91 create a stable and predictable set of rights and obligations
between the parties, 92 and establish reasonable mechanisms for objective dispute
resolution; 93 ii) include a consultation process and recognize the valuable
contributions of each party; 94 iii) ensure high revenue streams for the
government and, ultimately, for the benefit of the people it serves; 95 and iv)
embed the best knowledge available with regard to ecological management and
conservation. Where public law does not provide these structures, contracts
should act to enhance the regulatory environment.
1. First Example: United States
The United States, which is the most economically powerful country not
party to the UNCLOS, is also the country with the most developed technology
and machinery appropriate for seabed mining. The United States also has a
relatively well-developed statutory and administrative capacity with which to
address seabed mining, and thus ostensibly should meet the first governance
objective for seabed mining legislation by establishing a stable and predictable
system of rights. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) governs
seabed mining in the continental shelf and EEZ regions of the United States. 96
The country also has ample federal regulations governing offshore mineral
91. See Oliver, supra note 48 at 73 (detailing the importance of environmental protection in
seabed legislation).
92. See generally, e.g., MODEL LAW ON MINING ON COMMUNITY LAND IN AFRICA, INT’L ALL.
ON NAT. RES. IN AFR. (2016), http://eacsof.net/EACSOF/2016/08/22/model-law-on-mining-oncommunity-land-in-africa/.
93. Id. at 55-58.
94. Id. at 13-29.
95. See Friedland, supra note 52 at 1598-1599 (arguing that revenues from sea-based mining
must be substantial in order to fund government objectives and to offset inevitable environmental harms).
96. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1331.
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prospecting and leasing, such that lease parameters, formulas for determining
royalties and methods of valuation are addressed through federal regulations. 97
Finally, with respect to mining in the high seas, the United States filled the
regulatory gap left as a result of not being a state party to the UNCLOS by
passing the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 98 which steps outside
the international framework adopted by the vast majority of countries. This Act,
which is implemented by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
sets forth rules governing mining development in the high seas. NOAA also
administers the Deep Seabed Mining Regulations for Exploration Licenses 99 and
the Deep Sea Mining Regulations for Commercial Recovery Permits. 100
Taken together, these federal statutes and regulations constitute a
regulatory structure that is well developed compared to the legal and regulatory
structures present in or available to many coastal nations. Also, despite relatively
comprehensive language necessitating baseline environmental reports and
environmental impact statements under NOAA requirements, those
requirements are not always satisfactorily applied.
In the event of agency failure, or disagreement between the public and the
agency about the agency’s responsibilities, the availability of a well-developed
court system to hear and adjudicate disputes serves as a necessary buttress on the
legal infrastructure designed to regulate seabed mining and the enforcement of
environmental protections embedded in that infrastructure and fills a key
requirement for effective seabed mining governance. For example, in May 2015,
the Center for Biological Diversity filed a claim for declaratory relief against the
Secretary of Commerce and NOAA regarding NOAA’s “decision to grant two
exploratory licenses for mining in the deep ocean [outside of territorial waters]
without analyzing the environmental effects of doing so.” 101 The complaint,
which objects to NOAA’s decision to grant two license extensions to Lockheed
Martin Corporation for exploration in the Clarion Clipperton Zone, asserts that
NOAA failed to perform environmental analysis in granting the license
extensions, despite statutory requirements.
Some might argue that this incident and the existence of a complaint
suggest a governance failure. If the allegations in the complaint are true, this
argument would run, then NOAA did not adequately implement the statute and
properly execute its administrative functions. When one considers the role of the
courts in a well-developed legal system, however, the complaint might be viewed
as cause for comfort, if one also recognizes that the result of the complaint in
this case was a clarification from NOAA that under the current license
extensions, Lockheed Martin will not engage in at-sea exploration activities.
Rather, Lockheed Martin is in what it calls “Phase I,” “a preparatory stage which
includes activities for which no license would be required.” 102
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

E.g., 30 C.F.R. § 559, 580–582.
30 U.S.C. § 1401.
15 C.F.R. § 970.
Id.
Center for Biological Diversity v. Pritzker, No. 15-0723 at 2 (D.D.C. 2015).
Extension of Deep Seabed Exploration Licenses, Response to Comments, DEPARTMENT OF
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2. Second Example: Australia
Australia, a coastal state with a well-developed mining code, takes a stance
that is generally recognized as being “open for business” due to its stable mining
regulations and transparent court system for mining-related dispute resolution.
Australia systematically developed a state-by-state legal framework designed to
protect mining interests and was named the world’s most secure site for mining
investments by the Behre Dolbear group in 2005. 103
Still, Australia’s Northern Territory came under fire in 2012 when the
Northern Territory’s government revoked 11 offshore mining licenses held by
BHP Billiton, Northern Manganese, and Yukida Resources. 104 The revocations
provoked all three companies that had been in talks with the government, and
Northern Manganese has threatened suit, claiming more than $1 billion would
be necessary to compensate the company for its losses. 105 The licenses were
revoked in connection with a ban placed on seabed mining by the Northern
Territory Government that began in 2012 and has been extended through
2021. 106
It is notable that Australia’s legal framework for land mining is primarily
under the purview of individual states, and accordingly each state has created its
own mining management process in compliance with the relevant environmental
regulations. 107 This variation in regulatory structure may not be conducive to
upholding robust environmental management standards when applied to seabed
mining. Still, per the 1994 Offshore Minerals Act, mineral exploration and
mining activities can only happen in Australian waters with approval from the
relevant Joint Authority. 108 This Joint Authority is made up of the responsible
federal minister and the responsible state or Northern Territory minister,
ensuring cohesive action between the two levels of government. However, since
seabed mining in the Australian EEZ falls at least partially under federal
jurisdiction, the development of centralized environmental standards may help
keep future seabed mining ventures in compliance with best ecological
management practices, the fourth aforementioned tenet of good governance.

COMMERCE, NOAA, 1–3, 80 Fed. Reg. 250 (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-201512-30/pdf/2015-32889.pdf (last visited Mar 18, 2016). See also, Settlement Agreement, Center for
Biological Diversity v. Penny Pritzker, D. Dist. Colum. Settlement (2016) (on file with author).
103. Robin H. Chambers, An Overview of the Australian Legal Framework for Mining Projects
in Australia, CHAMBERS AND COMPANY INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS, http://www.chambers
lawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/10/060518-Presentation-Eng.pdf.
104. See Andrew Burrell, Court Clash Looms on BHP Seabed Ban, THE AUSTRALIAN (Sept. 10,
2013),
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/court-clash-looms-on-bhp-seabedban/news-story/709ddfeab4e630f1dec5c7e1cff39dfc6.
105. Id. See also Andrew Burrell, Mining Lobby Demands Compo, THE AUSTRALIAN (Sept. 11,
2013), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/mining-lobby-demands-compo/newsstory/a494840df91a1525bf10dd77cacbaa74.
106. See Jacqueline Breen, NT Seabed Mining Moratorium Extended, Drawing Mixed Reaction
From Stakeholders, ABC NEWS (May 15, 2018), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-16/nt-seabedmining-moratorium-extended-three-years/9764622 (stating that the seabed mining moratorium is the
result of “concerns about potential environmental impacts.”).
107. Chambers, supra note 103.
108. Offshore Minerals Act 1994 (Austl.) pts 1.3, 2.
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3. Third Example: New Zealand
New Zealand is yet another example of a country whose regulatory regime
with respect to mining activity within its EEZ and continental shelf is relatively
well developed. New Zealand’s regulatory regime is reasonably equipped to
meet the suggested requirements for effective governance of seabed mining.
New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act 2012 was
drafted recently enough to contemplate seabed mining in its definitions and
substantive provisions. 109 For example, Section 20 of the Act restricts the type
of disturbances that would be inevitable in seabed mining: e.g., deposits into the
water column; deposits of material onto the seabed; and creating light and
vibrations and explosions. 110
In addition, the New Zealand Environmental Protection Authority is
relatively well equipped to receive applications and make decisions about seabed
activity. 111 In the case of New Zealand, this is essential, as the country boasts
“one of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones in the world, 20 times the size of
[their] land mass.” 112 It thus has experienced agencies charged with
implementing regulations and balancing the commercial and environmental
interests implicated in marine mining in furtherance of the Act’s goal, which is
to promote the sustainable management of the area’s natural resources. 113 As the
manager of EEZ applications for the New Zealand EPA described during
Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation in 2014,
governments must favor caution and environmental protections when
information is uncertain or inadequate, as it is in the context of seabed mining. 114
In addition, in the event that legal and administrative structures fail, New
Zealand’s court system is well positioned to handle complaints.
In February 2015, New Zealand’s Environmental Protection Agency
denied an application by Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited for a license to mine
at least 30 square kilometers of seabed per year to recover 1.5 million tons of
phosphate nodules from the Chatham Rise, east of Christchurch. 115 This was the
109. Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 pts 1, 4
(N.Z.).
110. Id. at § 20.
111. For an overview of the New Zealand EPA structure, and specifically the current activity in
the New Zealand EEZ, see EEZ Marine Activities, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.govt.nz/industry-areas/eez-marine-activities/ongoing-activity-or-activity-about-tocommence-in-the-eez/marine-scientific-research-prospecting-and-exploration/ (last visited Nov. 20,
2020).
112. See EEZ Marine Activities, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.
govt.nz/industry-areas/eez-marine-activities/about-the-exclusive-economic-zone-and-continental-shelf/
(last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
113. See Our Role In New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Documents-/Documents/Marine-Activities-EEZ/Guid
ance/EPAs-role-in-EEZ.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
114. Richard Johnson, Manager of EEZ Applications, New Zealand EPA, Presentation at
Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation (Oct. 7-9, 2014) (notes on file with the
author).
115. See Environmental Protection Authority, Decision on Marine Consent Application:
Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited, NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT (2015), https://www.epa.
govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Documents/Marine-Activities-EEZ/Activities/990a6509eb/CRP-Decision-
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third application for marine mining received by New Zealand’s EPA. One of
those applications was granted, and the other was denied. 116 The Chatham Rock
Phosphate decision was notable because, in connection with its refusal to grant
a license, the EPA issued strong statements about its role in protecting the marine
environment from potentially degrading mining activity. In particular, it noted
that “the DMC [Decision- Making Committee] found that the destructive effects
of the extraction process, coupled with the potentially significant impact of the
deposition of sediment on areas adjacent to the mining blocks and on the wider
marine ecosystem, could not be mitigated by any set of conditions of adaptive
management regime that might reasonably be imposed.” 117
The comprehensive regulatory structures established by New Zealand’s
existing mining legislation involve a balance between ecological management
and sustainable growth, a consultation process for licensing, and the inclusion of
best environmental practices, effectively meeting three out of the four suggested
requirements for seabed mining governance. Thus, they are able to provide a
model to which other countries in need of advanced regulation can look for
guidance when reconciling more dated, land-based mining legislation with the
needs of seabed mining. Similarly, these regulatory structures can be instructive
in designing strong contracts where legislation may be lacking.
C. Governments Transitioning to Robust Regulatory and Administrative
Structures
In addition to countries already possessing mining legislation, the lucrative
potential of seabed mining has prompted the Cook Islands, a country with very
little previous experience with land-based mining, to develop a relatively
comprehensive legislative framework in order to address seabed mining as a new
source of national revenue. It is estimated that the Cook Islands’ two million
square kilometer EEZ may contain between fifty million 118 and ten billion 119
tons of manganese nodules. The expected net gain from the extraction of these
resources could rise into the tens of billions of dollars. 120 The country established
a Seabed Minerals Authority in 2012. 121
EEZ000006.pdf. See also, EEPA Refuses Marine Consent to Chatham Rock, DREDGING TODAY (Feb. 11,
2015), https://www.dredgingtoday.com/2015/02/11/epa-refuses-marine-consent-to-chatham-rock/.
116. See Duncan Currie and David Bullock, THE TRANS-TASMAN RESOURCES COURT OF
APPEAL JUDGMENT: A SUMMARY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, 2 (April 2020).
117. Jamie Morton, EPA Rejects Second Seabed Mining Bid, NZ HERALD, (Feb. 10, 2015)
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/epa-rejects-second-seabed-mining-bid/YL7CZUWJXBBNQIMN3MJAQ
QKYRA/ (quoting Sarah Gardener, the New Zealand General Manager for Applications and Assessment.)
118. COOK ISLANDS COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF DEEP SEA MINING. See also CARDNO, AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MINING DEEP-SEA MINERALS IN THE PACIFIC ISLAND
REGION: DEEP-SEA MINING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, at 4.4.1 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5cca30fab2cf793ec6d94096/t/5d9d23f4903eb63f750437fc/1570580036946/A+2016+Assessment
+of+the+Costs+and+Benefits+of+Mining+Deep+Sea+Minerals.pdf.
119. Rupert Neate, Seabed Mining Could Earn Cook Islands ‘Tens of Billions of Dollars,’ THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/05/seabed-mining-cookislands-billions.
120. Id. But see Cardno, supra note 118.
121. Home, COOK ISLANDS SEABED MINERALS AUTHORITY, http://www.seabedminerals
authority.gov.ck/. See also Michael Petterson and Akuila Tawake, The Cook Islands (South Pacific)
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In the face of this potential, the Cook Islands quickly enacted its first
Seabed Minerals Act in 2009. Ten years later, in 2019, after drafting a bill with
assistance from the New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel and advice from the
Secretariat of the Pacific, the Cook Islands government approved an updated
Seabed Minerals Act in order to move forward with the issuance of exploratory
mining licenses in its EEZ. 122
Various mechanisms of the legislation (CISMA 2019) meet some of the
core objectives for effective seabed governance identified throughout the
Article, 123 and may be able to serve as a starting point for a blueprint for other
Pacific Island nations should seabed mining proliferate in the region. However,
if there are regulatory gaps, either because a given country has not yet developed
robust legislation or because the legislation in place leaves the country underprotected, other means, such as contracts or license agreements, will be
necessary to fill them.
The primary purpose of the introduction of CISMA 2019 is to create a new
source of national revenue, and the structure of the Act reflects that goal. Since
the Act does not cover commercial mining and seabed mining in the Cook
Islands EEZ, such activity must be done in partnership with the government. Part
Six of CISMA 2019 asserts that the holder of a mining license is required to pay
prescribed fees, customs duties and taxes in accordance with Cook Islands law
and royalties in accordance with the 2013 Seabed Minerals (Royalties)
Regulations. 124 Furthermore, CISMA 2019 outlines the government’s intention
to create a sovereign wealth fund that will distribute royalties and all revenue
excluding trade (e.g. license fees) to Cook Islands citizens, thereby boosting
household incomes. 125 However, these financial arrangements may work better
in theory than in practice, should seabed mining in the EEZ prove lucrative.
Under the 2013 Regulations, title holders are required to pay royalties of only
three percent, 126 and this rule has not been updated in CISMA 2019. 127 Thus, it
may be in the best interest of the Cook Islands government to consider increasing
royalty payments in order to ensure that the Cook Islands receives a substantial
share of the revenue from seabed mining.
Part Two of the Act establishes a national Seabed Minerals Authority, and
clearly delegates the duties, powers and responsibilities of that authority, which
include publishing annual reports updating the public on the progress of Cook
Experience in Governance of Seabed Manganese Nodule Mining, 167 OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT
1 (2018).
122. The bill was passed in June 2019. See Seabed Minerals Act 2019 (C.I.),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cca30fab2cf793ec6d94096/t/5d3f683993ea3f0001b7379c/15644
36729995/Seabed+Minerals+Act+2019; Cook Islands Government Consulting on New Seabed Mining
Bill, RADIO NEW ZEALAND (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/
379172/cook-islands-govt-consulting-on-new-seabed-mining-bill.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
124. Seabed Minerals Act, supra note 122, at pt 6 § 98.
125. Id. at § 100.
126. Seabed Minerals (Royalties) Regulations 2013, s 4 subs 1 (C.I.).
127. To better understand the royalty structure and the annual revenue potential for seabed
mining in the Cook Islands, an elaboration of the Cook Islands tax law would be necessary, but that is
beyond the scope of this Article.

124

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 46: 103

Islands seabed mining. 128 Part Two also creates a licensing panel meant to advise
on the granting and revocation of seabed mining licenses, the operating details
of which are outlined in Part Four of CISMA 2019. 129 The diversity of the
licensing panel, created with an exhaustive list of who may be considered for
membership as well as the necessary qualifications they must possess, and the
comprehensive nature of its vetting process may be key to establishing its
credibility and is one aspect of CISMA 2019 that other Pacific countries may
seek to replicate. 130
The ocean and marine life are central to Cook Islands indigenous cultural
identity. 131 CISMA 2019 makes its purpose clear: it is to “provide for interaction
between this Act and national law relating to environmental impact assessment
consents, project permits and environmental management.” 132 Further,
applicants for seabed mining licenses are required to comply with both the 2003
Environment Act and the 2017 Marae Moana Act. 133 The Marae Moana Act
designates the entirety of the Cook Islands EEZ as a protected area. Marae
Moana was created with the intention to “protect and conserve the ecological,
biodiversity and heritage values of the Cook Islands marine environment…[and
to] provide an integrated decision-making and management framework to
coordinate the work of relevant agencies so as to effectively balance marine
conservation with ecologically sustainable use of the marine environment and
resources.” 134
Still, the effectiveness of the CISMA 2019/Marae Moana regulatory
structure lies in its ability to enforce environmental protections. CISMA 2019
includes a section on enforcement powers in which it asserts that both civil and
criminal punishment may occur with the full weight of the Cook Islands
government should the Act be violated, 135 and it is key that these assertions are
not merely superficial; ecologically sustainable seabed mining will not be
possible in the Cook Islands or any other Pacific country without legitimate
enforcement of environmental laws.
D. Governments with Less-Developed Regulatory and Administrative
Structures
Several countries with less developed legal structures have come under
intensifying pressure to provide exploration and/or exploitation licenses for
seabed minerals under their sovereign control. Island nations in the South Pacific
are attracting particularly intense attention, and the result is that more than “300

128. Seabed Minerals Act, supra note 122, at pt 2 subpt 1 ss 12-20.
129. Id. at subpt 2.
130. Id. at s 25.
131. Francie Diep, How a Small Island Nation is Working to Protect its Ocean in the Face of
Climate Change, PACIFIC STANDARD (July 21, 2017), https://psmag.com/environment/cook-islandsmassive-marine-preserve.
132. Seabed Minerals Act, supra note 122, at pt 1 s 3 subs 1.
133. Id. at pt 5 s 91.
134. Marae Moana Act, 2017, pt 1 s 33 subs 1-2a (C.I.).
135. Id at pt 7.
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exploration licenses have been granted in Pacific Island countries.” 136 To
alleviate the problems caused by insufficient or non-existent legal, and
regulatory structures, coupled with the relative lack of legal, technical and
administrative capacity in a number of Pacific Island nations, the European
Union, together with the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) initiated
the SPC-EU EDF 10 Deep Sea Minerals Project (SPC-DSM Project). A central
goal of the project was:
. . . to support informed and careful governance of any deep sea mining activities in
accordance with international law, with particular attention to the protection of the
marine environment and securing equitable financial arrangements for Pacific Island
countries and their people. 137

To this end, the SPC has been working in 15 countries 138 to develop
regional legislative and regulatory frameworks, as well as to formulate national
policy, legislation and regulation for seabed mining in each of its countries of
operation. 139
Working with SPC, these countries are in the process of adopting domestic
structures to address seabed mining. The SPC points to the novelty of these
institutional innovations:
Very few countries in the world have taken these vital legal steps. The Pacific ACP
states 140 are leading the way. It is anticipated that this Regional Legislative and
Regulatory Framework (RLRF) . . . will prove to be an invaluable roadmap for
Pacific Island states in tackling this new and complex area. The RLRF seeks to give
policy-makers, lawyers and technical agencies the best information currently
available to enable informed decision-making for the long-term benefit of Pacific
Island communities and future generations. 141

In addition to these activities, the SPC-DSM Project aims to facilitate
seabed mining for each country in which it operates. Indeed, much of its work is
geared toward generating interest among investors, governments, and citizens in
seabed mining. This can be seen by taking stock of the contents of its
informational reports and brochures, which primarily contain information about
mineral deposits and mining, and far less information about regulatory structure
and protective legislation. 142
136. Vanuatu Prepares for Deep Sea Mining, THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Vanuatu-Prepares-for-Deep-Sea-Mining-2014-10-23.
137. Secretariat of the Pacific Community, European Union Deep Sea Minerals Project (SPCEU DSM Project), UN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS PARTNERSHIPS PLATFORM,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=7645 (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
138. The countries in which the SPC-DSM Project is working are: Cook Islands, Federated States
of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Timor Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. See About the SPC-EU Deep Sea Minerals Project,
SPC-EU DEEP SEA MINERALS PROJECT, https://dsm.gsd.spc.int/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
139. Id.
140. The “Pacific ACP states” refers to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States. See
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES, http://www.acp.int/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2020).
141. SPC-EU EDF10 Deep Sea Minerals Project, Pacific-ACP States Regional Legislative and
Regulatory Framework for Deep Sea Minerals Exploration and Exploitation, iii (July 2012),
https://www.smenet.org/docs/public/FinalDeepSeaMineralsProjectReport.pdf.
142. Brochures, SPC-EU DEEP SEA MINERALS PROJECT, http://gsd.spc.int/dsm/index.php/
resources (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
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The seabed mining facilitation and capacitation approach of the SPC-DSM
Project has come under fire from local and regional NGOs and civil society
organizations. A collaboration between two of the more active organizations on
the issue of seabed mining provides a legal analysis of the SPC-DSM Project
and, more specifically, its Regional Legislative and Regulatory Framework
(RLRF). Its summary, which is worth quoting at some length, states:
Overall, the RLRF paints a positive picture of DSM—one that arguably prioritizes
creating a climate favorable to industry and DSM operators over the economic and cultural
rights of indigenous peoples. It advises States to incentivize investors by providing an
environment that fosters investment, recommending that States provide predictable and stable
governance, reasonable taxation, and legislation that takes into account corporate risks and
investments. It similarly emphasizes the purported benefits of DSM, while downplaying the
range of adverse impacts (actual and potential) associated with DSM. By stating that any
impacts are ‘extremely minimal’ or, alternatively, that DSM-related activities have ‘almost no
impact,’ the Framework minimizes the importance of State adherence to the precautionary
principle . . . .
Along a similar vein, the RLRF relegates the concerns and interests of indigenous
peoples to the sidelines, largely ignoring their rights to land, culture, and resources . . . .
Historically, indigenous peoples worldwide have experienced displacement, loss of land,
depletion of means of subsistence, negative health impacts, and other cultural and social
deprivations as a consequence of these activities. Such harms are likely to be replicated in the
case of DSM, particularly if regulatory frameworks lacking comprehensive protections . . . are
adopted. 143

This section has detailed the importance of national regulatory structures
to the current and future regulation of seabed mining, and has provided a
framework for understanding the broad spectrum of legal capacity and
preparedness within the constitutional and legislative structures of countries
contemplating seabed mining within their jurisdiction. In the next Part, this
Article will focus on the experience of Vanuatu, as it has become a focus of
seabed mining companies and a location of interest for the SPC-DSM Project.
III. VANUATU AND THE DISCOVERY OF EXPLORATION LICENSES
A. Vanuatu’s Marine Resources and Regulatory Structure
The Republic of Vanuatu is one of the poorest countries in the world.
Indeed, it regularly appears near the bottom of the World Bank’s GDP index. In
2018, Vanuatu ranked 192nd of 204 ranked countries by GDP. 144 On the 2019
Human Development Index, Vanuatu is ranked 141 of 189 ranked countries. 145
Nonetheless, Vanuatu has performed an intensive self-study on the level of
overall life satisfaction of its population and found notably high self-assessments
of overall satisfaction. Among the key contributors to this phenomenon is ample
access to marine resources. Forty-seven percent of Vanuatu citizens live within
fifteen minute’s walking distance to the ocean, and eighty-three percent live

143. BlueOceanLaw in collaboration with Pacific Network on Globalization, An Assessment of
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community Regional Legislative and Regulatory Framework for Deep Sea
Minerals Exploration and Exploitation, 2 (on file with author).
144. GDP Ranking (GDP) Data Catalog, WORLD BANK (2018).
145. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, 2019 HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT INDEX RANKING (2019), http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-indexranking.
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within an hour’s walk. 146 The self-study reveals a correlation between access to
marine resources and happiness. 147
This self-reported correlation between well-being and access to marine
resources amplifies the importance of protecting these resources. This is all the
more true for a population that would have very little economic resilience if the
marine environment were harmed.
Vanuatu’s marine wealth includes resources that are found, harvested or
hunted by people with ready access to ocean. 148 People living close to the coasts
also exchange resources with people living inland, amplifying their access to
land-based resources and contributing to Vanuatu’s vital non-monetary, barter
economy. 149
Vanuatu’s national territorial waters, EEZ, and continental shelf also
contain hidden mineral riches that have the potential to travel through the global
monetary economy. In recent years it has become evident that Vanuatu’s
sovereign seabed contains seafloor massive sulphides, which could contain
“significant quantities of copper, gold, zinc, silver, and other commercially
viable minerals.” 150 The monetary value of these deposits is highly speculative,
but recall that it is estimated that the nearby Cook Islands’ Continental Shelf may
contain “as many as 12 billion tonnes of mineral rich manganese nodules tons of
manganese nodules.” 151 In the face of this potential, the Cook Islands quickly
enacted its first Seabed Minerals Act in 2009, and in 2012 that country
established a Seabed Minerals Authority. 152
The high value placed on both the non-monetized resources on which NiVanuatu people depend for their well-being and the monetizable mineral
resources on its sovereign seabed suggests the need for a significant deliberative
process over the best uses of Vanuatu’s marine territory. If seabed mining is to
take place in Vanuatu, it also suggests the imperative for a well-developed
regulatory structure that will balance the traditional, central importance of
popular access to marine resources and the likely environmental consequences
of seabed mining.
Vanuatu, however, has very little experience with land-based mining and
thus has a very thin regulatory structure with respect to land-based mining. Even
more importantly, until very recently, Vanuatu had absolutely no legal or
regulatory structure with respect to seabed mining. The existing Minerals and
146. VANUATU NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE WITH MALVATUMAURI NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHIEFS, INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING FOR MELANESIA: VANUATU PILOT STUDY REPORT, 33 (2012),
http://www.christensenfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Alternative-Indicators-Vanuatu.pdf.
147. Id. at 34.
148. According to one presenter at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy
Consultation Conference, 77% of people in Vanuatu live in coastal areas and are involved in fishing of
some form. Malcolm Clark, Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy
Consultation Conference (October 8, 2014) (notes on file with author).
149. VANUATU NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE WITH MALVATUMAURI NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHIEFS, supra note 146, at 32.
150. THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE, supra note 136.
151. Cook Islands, Seabed Mineral Authority, Discover Cook Islands Seabed Minerals,
https://www.sbma.gov.ck/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
152. Seabed Minerals Act, supra note 122.
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Mining Act was drafted in 1986 and, as in the Cook Islands, the Act, which
contemplates land-based activity, is in the process of being amended to attempt
to address seabed prospecting and mining. 153 At the time Vanuatu was initiating
its amendment process, the SPC EU-DSM Project had provided Vanuatu’s
Department of Geology and Mines with a model Deep Sea Minerals Draft
Policy. 154 These documents, which were being drafted and amended very rapidly
in Vanuatu, are as novel and unfamiliar as the simultaneous pressure from seabed
mining companies to extend licenses to explore and prospect Vanuatu’s
sovereign territory and EEZ.
B. Prior Licenses
On June 10, 2013, during his opening address at the Regional Training
Workshop on Social Impacts of Deep Sea Mining Activities and Stakeholder
Participation in Port Vila, Vanuatu, the country’s Minister for Lands and Natural
Resources disclosed for the first time that he had recently discovered that, during
the previous five years, his predecessor had granted “about 145 licenses for
offshore mining exploration and prospecting and another 3 for offshore oil
exploration.” 155 His announcement was as follows:
When I learnt that this workshop was going to happen, as the Minister
responsible I decided to find out what I could about this issue. In undertaking my
research, I made a very disconcerting discovery, something that in my five years as
a parliamentarian and just over one year (accumulated) as a minister of state I never
knew: that in the past five years, the Government of Vanuatu has issued about 145
licenses for offshore mining exploration and prospecting, and another 3 for offshore
oil exploration.
By announcing this discovery of mine today, I am also making this information
public in Vanuatu for the first time, and I have no doubt that this will be the first time
that 99% of the population of this country is aware of this.
Needless to say, these licenses have been issued without any proper national
regulatory framework for seabed mining or for scientific research, let alone any
proper understanding of what the prospecting process entails and what lies on our
seabed—this is, after all, the common situation all our countries find ourselves in
when engaging with seabed mineral issues.
What concerns me most, however, is that the government has been proceeding
down a path of action without the people it is supposed to represent agreeing to or
even knowing about what we are doing.
The Vanuatu participants in this workshop know my reputation well as
someone who is in politics to increase the transparency and accountability of
government, which to me means being accountable and responsible to the people of
this country whom we represent and who pay our salaries with their taxes. 156

His announcement revealed the disconnect between the purported
153. REPUBLIC OF VANUATU, THE AMENDMENT OF MINES AND MINERALS ACT, CAP 190 NO.
06 OF 1986 (1986) (proposed amendment).
154. VANUATU DEEP SEA MINERALS DRAFT POLICY (2014) (on file with author).
155. Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, Vanuatu Minister Calls on Pacific Governments to Respect
People’s Wishes on Experimental Seabed Mining, DEEP SEA MINING: OUT OF OUR DEPTH (May 10, 2013)
http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/vanuatu-minister-calls-on-pacific-govts-to-respectpeoples-wishes-on-experimental-seabed-mining/.
156. Id.
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commitment of companies like Bismarck Mining Corporation, which has stated
publicly that they place a high premium on the social license to operate, 157 and
the discovery that they had entered into a number of exploration licenses in
Vanuatu without any consideration by the population, or even the nation’s
Parliament. 158
Only after the Minster of Lands and Natural Resources had discovered the
existing licenses did the Ni-Vanuatu population learn that the government had
opened Vanuatu to this activity. In July 2014, the editor of one of Vanuatu’s
national newspapers revealed to this author that he was not aware of the licenses.
Fieldwork by the author at the time reinforced that only a limited number of
individuals, primarily those in government or working for national NGOs, had
any knowledge of the exploration licenses. Among those groups that knew of the
licenses, there was notable opposition. For example, the President of the Vanuatu
National Council of Women stated:
As President of the Vanuatu National Council of Women (VNCW) who make up
49% of the population of this country … our women in Vanuatu do not want to see
deep sea mining to operate in and around Vanuatu islands due to environmental
threats. …The women of Vanuatu are joining in and supporting their sisters from
PNG and Solomon Islands who also do not agree to be exposed to some irreversible
catastrophic changes and left with a poisoned and polluted Pacific Ocean without
fish. Hon. Minister, we look forward to your positive intervention in this regard in
ensuring a safe and sustainable environment for the future of this Nation. 159

C. Consultation Process
The Minister of Lands and Natural Resources has not taken a position on
the licenses, or on their renewals. Rather, he has taken the view that his
responsibility as a public servant is to assure that any position he takes on the
question of seabed mining is informed by his constituents. To that end, in
October 2014, the Minister initiated a national consultation process that was
designed to include members of Parliament, the Council of Chiefs, regional and
national NGOs, civil society associations, and the public at large. This
consultation process was initiated during a three-day conference in the country’s
capital city, Port Vila, and the intention of the Minister was to continue the
consultation process on many of Vanuatu’s eighty-three islands. This is
consistent with the Minister’s view that the only way to legitimately proceed
with seabed exploration and mining, if it is to continue in Vanuatu, is with the
free, prior, and informed consent of the country’s people.

157. Harvey Cook, Tim McConachy, and Sophie Egden, Bismarck Mining Corporation
(Vanuatu) Limited SOPAC Presentation, 18, http://dsm.gsd.spc.int/public/files/meetings/Wednesday%
2012th/Session%2011Neptune%20Vanuatu%20SOPAC%20Presentation.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
158. Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, supra note 155.
159. Id.
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D. Drafting the Model Contract
Following the consultation process, the author drafted a Model Contract 160
with the intention to include the promises and expectations expressed by the
company and the Ni-Vanuatu people during the consultation, and to establish the
means for effectively mitigating and accounting for the possible risks presented
by such an operation. The Model Contract totals 77 pages and includes terms
addressing the expectations and obligations for each step of the mining process,
including the determination of initial feasibility, the issuance (and possible
relinquishment) of a prospecting license, the management of ongoing operations,
and the distribution of benefits and profits. Importantly, it also includes extensive
terms regarding transparency, accountability, and liability for any harms caused.
The Model Contract’s guiding principles and their embodiment in its concrete
terms provide useful examples of the important role contracts can play in
promoting equitable outcomes and mitigating harms for seabed mining
operations and will be discussed at length in the following sections.
IV. GOVERNANCE TOOLS IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG REGULATORY STRUCTURE
In locations or contexts with strong constitutional, statutory, regulatory,
and administrative structures, private transactions are largely supported by that
legal infrastructure. But what happens in the context of novel activity like seabed
mining, in which the likely benefits and harms are still largely unknown? And,
more importantly, how can the law balance and provide structure for the
competing interests of commercial gain on the one hand, and environmental and
human well-being concerns on the other, in locations like Vanuatu, where the
experience and legal infrastructure that exists in places like the United States,
Australia and New Zealand is largely absent?
In contexts such as these, it is imperative to appreciate the importance of
the contract between the government and the companies seeking to explore,
prospect, and exploit seabed minerals as a contract between the parties which
must balance the commercial and public interest, assuring that known and
unknown benefits and risks are allocated appropriately during the term of the
activity and that conflicts between the parties have a reasonable likelihood of
being solved promptly and impartially.
In the mining sector, the license agreement between the government and
the mining company provides the exclusive right to explore or extract minerals

160. Christiana Ochoa, Model Prospecting License: Republic of Vanuatu (Mar. 29, 2016) (on file
with author). In October 2014, the Minister of Mines and Natural Resources requested advice regarding
necessary changes to the existing license agreements. The Model Contract relied on stakeholder
representations made during the consultation process and extensive research to draw on an array of best
practices in the mining sector with respect to the elements discussed in Section IV.A. The document was
intended as a means to disrupt the default dependence on initial drafts typically provided by companies,
which favor companies either by means of ambiguity or by creating explicitly unfavorable terms for
governments. The document was drafted with the purpose of asserting best practices and thus re-balancing
negotiations between the government of Vanuatu and companies seeking prospecting licenses for
Vanuatu’s seabed minerals. The Model Contract is available by request for review and use by other
countries.
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within a determined area of land in exchange for a set of promises and
obligations, including payment of royalties and taxes, environmental
assessments and remediation, social obligations and so on. In locations like
South Africa or the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Ontario, with
significant experience with mining and where the basic statutory and regulatory
framework is relatively strong, companies and governments tend to rely more on
this public legal infrastructure and less on contracts. In locations where the
mining sector is just developing, it is more common to see comprehensive
contracts that attempt to fill the gaps left open by an inadequately developed
legal environment.
Unfortunately, the substantive provisions of Vanuatu’s initial license
agreements were woefully bare—each consisting of less than 450 words. 161 In
combination with the insufficiency of Vanuatu’s statutory and regulatory
structure, these license agreements amount to a license to nearly absolute
impunity for the mining companies that have signed these agreements. The
licenses were simply under-suited to the importance of this novel activity. For
this reason, the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources sought outside
assistance in creating a new model license agreement.
A. The Role of Contracts
A collaborative publication between a number of organizations working on
sustainable development, legal best practices, and natural resource governance
provides a useful aid to considering both the importance of contracts in such
situations and also provides insights into strong contract clauses and policy
considerations. 162 The guide usefully summarizes both the hierarchy of law in
which, ideally, national constitutions provide the substrate on which all stable
legal structures depend, followed by the laws and then the regulations within a
country. In many settings, these legal structures provide the largest portion of the
regulatory structure governing natural resource extraction activity. In a
significant number of cases, however, “contracts are specifically designed to take
precedence over domestic laws (though sometimes the laws will not allow this)
. . . . However, the more comprehensive the domestic framework, the stronger
the tendency is for domestic law to take precedence.” 163 As they further explain,
“in a relatively comprehensive legal environment, a contract could be extremely
short. A contract in one country may be 250 pages and only 15 pages in another.”
This concept is captured by the Figure 1 below. 164

161. Republic of Vanuatu, Prospecting License, PL1713, Renewal 1, Fortuna 1 Tafea Province,
Nautilus Minerals Offshore 16 Limited (May 2014) (on file with author).
162. NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 15.
163. Id.
164. Figure 1 appears in NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 16.
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Figure 1

As detailed herein, any license agreement between a government and
interested seabed mining companies will need to accomplish four objectives.
First, it will need to do what any good long-term contract should do: create
a stable and predictable set of rights and obligations between the parties and
establish reasonable mechanisms for objective dispute resolution. In the context
of experimental activity, such as seabed mining, which to date has never been
undertaken, these terms are of vital importance. While many of these terms may
normally be captured by domestic constitutions, mining laws, and regulations,
the absence of these basic structures demands heightened attention to the basic
contract terms.
Second, it will need to fully appreciate the valuable contributions of each
party to the contract as well as the risks each party is undertaking. While it is true
that mining companies may hold the promise of being able to provide the
machinery and technological expertise to access the mineral wealth on the
seabed, that mineral wealth ultimately belongs to the citizens and governments
of each county with jurisdiction over those resources. At the same time, both
parties bear substantial risks. Companies will bear responsibility to investors or
shareholders who have financed mining activity, while governments bear the risk
of environmental catastrophes and poor management of the potential or actual
income from mining activity. In other words, both parties play important roles
in converting mineral wealth into monetary resources, and both parties bear
substantial risks. The contract should reflect this reality and assure that the
compensation paid to each party properly reflects the proportional contributions
and potential risks each party bears.
The third goal is largely dependent on the second and intimately connected
with it: the contract should reflect the intentions, conditions, expectations, and
trepidations of local populations. In order to accomplish this, a robust process of
free, prior, and informed consultation/consent (FPIC) is necessary, not just to
ensure good process. Communities must have the opportunity to object to seabed
mining and, if they approve it, to contribute to the substantive terms and
conditions of the contract such that the legal rights and obligations created by
that document reflect the terms on which the local population consented to
mining activity. This third factor is particularly important in light of the parol
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evidence rule (in jurisdictions where it is applicable), 165 a common law doctrine
which dictates that, when a contract is determined to be completely incorporated
(meaning that all of the terms of the agreement are included in the written
document) and its terms are unambiguous, no evidence can be presented of prior
negotiations in an attempt to dispute or add to the contract terms. 166 Most license
agreements will either clearly state that the contract is a full and complete
representation of the agreement between the parties or, given the nature of their
content are likely to be deemed to be fully integrated contracts, any term,
understanding or promise made by either party that is not included in the license
agreement will not be enforceable. The result is that any representation made by,
for example, the mining companies or experts they hire to provide information
during community consultation processes and on which community consent may
have hinged, will not be enforceable against the companies if it is not expressly
included in the terms of the document. 167
Finally, the contract must do what the relatively slow statutory innovation
process impedes: it must capitalize on its relative nimbleness and flexibility and
incorporate state-of-the-art ecology management theory and development theory
such that the contract can reflect what statutory, regulatory or administrative
approaches will be slower to integrate. The contract is able to and should
translate concepts like the precautionary principle, adaptive management and the
well-being approach, rather than the growth-based approach to commercial
activity. Each of these four objectives will be explored in further detail below.
Before delving into these innovations, it is important to acknowledge their
possible impacts on firms’ willingness to accept the resulting contract terms,
such as a possible “race to the bottom” that favors countries that require less
stringent safeguards and less demanding social terms. While such a result cannot
be ruled out entirely, the establishment of increased transparency of contract
terms as a norm within the mining industry is playing an important role in the
adoption of more equitable and mutually beneficial contracts. One of the greatest
barriers to equitable outcomes in the mining industry has long been its reliance
on the non-disclosure of contract terms. Recent years have seen a change in this
approach with the creation of systems of accountability such as the Extractive
Industry Transparency Initiative 168 and the work of Oxfam, 169 the International
Council on Mining & Metals, 170 and others. When the public is given access to

165. The parol evidence rule is misleading as it is neither limited to parol (oral) communication,
nor is it a procedural rule of evidence. Rather, the rule is a facet of substantive contract law that limits the
admissibility of evidence in contract disputes beyond the “four corners” of the contract itself. See E. Allen
Farnsworth, CONTRACTS 427-28 (3d ed. 1999).
166. Id. at 431.
167. Id.
168. See THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2020).
169. See Contract Disclosure Survey, OXFAM, https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/contractdisclosure-survey-2018 (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) (stating that “contract disclosure in the oil, gas, and
mining sector is an emerging global norm.”).
170. See Contract Transparency, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS,
https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/society-and-the-economy/governance-and-transparency/contract-transpa
rency (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
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the terms of mining contracts, it has been shown that companies are more likely
to agree to more equitable terms, and these systems of accountability go a long
way to counter the impacts of imbalanced bargaining power in the industry.
The importance of transparency extends beyond the contract terms and
reaches into performance on the contract as well. In locations with thin
governance capacity, the administrative infrastructure to monitor compliance
may also be lacking. The contract terms must anticipate this possibility by
building into the contract the full cost of governments’ monitoring and managing
compliance into the terms or, alternatively, make explicit the requirement of
transparent and frequent reporting on the part of the company.
Additionally, because of the formidable risks to the economic and cultural
sovereignty and well-being of impacted communities, development in this
industry should rightly be based on certain minimal standards of care. If
countries are to consider allowing for companies to engage in these activities
within their EEZ’s, consent should be conditional on a commitment to practices
and systems of accountability in line with the principles discussed below.
B. Coming to Terms
1. First Objective: Create a Stable Relationship
Long-term commercial contracts regarding high-risk activity must provide
a stable and predictable set of rights and obligations for each of the parties
thereto. The mining companies engaged with the Pacific Islands have
background in land-based mining and in sea-based oil exploration. In both of
those sectors, ample history and experience means that there are model contracts
from which useful language can provide familiar and tested provisions for the
allocation of the basic rights and obligations of the parties. In addition to the
International Bar Association’s Model Mining Development Agreement, recent
work by a number of organizations has made natural resource contracts in the
petroleum and mining sector available to the public at large. 171 This is a very
useful step in an industry that has been notorious for secret company-government
agreements. 172 The model provided by the MMDA and the examples in newly
available repositories of government-company agreements in the extractive
industries make it much more likely that new contracts can follow best-practices
with respect to the basic elements common in mining contracts.
This is not enough, however. In order to attempt to provide the necessary
protections for this activity, the most protective existing model contracts,
statutes, and regulations provide much needed material. 173 The above cited
171. DIRECTORY OF PETROLEUM AND MINERAL CONTRACTS, http://www.resourcecontracts.org/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
172. OPEN CONTRACTING PARTNERSHIP, http://www.open-contracting.org/ (last visited Jan 28,
2020). See generally Peter Rosenblum & Susan Maples, Contracts Confidential: Ending Secret Deals in
the Extractive Industries, REVENUE WATCH INSTITUTE (2009) https://resourcegovernance.org/
sites/default/files/RWI-Contracts-Confidential.pdf (arguing for more transparency in extractive industry
contracts).
173. The argument here is not that contracts on seabed mining will prevent all such harms. Landbased mining, whether structured through legislation and licenses or through contracts, provides ample
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statutes and regulations in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand provide
necessary language and also very important information with respect to the
cautious approach each of those countries is taking on seabed mining. Finally,
the International Seabed Authority’s regulations on each of the three main types
of seabed mineral types and their model exploration contract terms provide
useful language that must form a baseline for allocating rights and
responsibilities as well as benefits and risks.174 Some of the more notable
elements of these domestic and international regulations will be discussed below,
accompanied by examples from the Model Contract drafted for Vanuatu;
illustrating how these regulatory goals can be incorporated into a contractual
agreement in the absence of strong regulatory systems with the aim of creating a
stable and predictable set of rights and obligations between the parties, and
establishing reasonable mechanisms for objective dispute resolution.
In the absence of sufficient regulation, transparent contracts play a vital
role in creating a stable relationship. Three regulatory elements that contribute
to these goals will be discussed in this section: (1) the right of the country or
regulating organization to proactively assess the potential harm that might occur
and the obligation of the company to aid in that process; (2) determinations of
the ability of the company to truly live up to its promises regarding the
implementation of the proposed project and any precautionary or remedial
measures it commits to take; and (3) specific provisions detailing the amount of
liability the company will face and the appropriate remedy for harm caused. This
section will briefly touch on these three core regulatory functions as expressed
by the ISA and the governments of New Zealand, Australia, and the United
States.
a. Environmental and Social Impact Assessments and
Monitoring
The right of the country to be able to consider the likely impacts of a project
before it begins, as well as to monitor the actual social and environmental
impacts as the project progresses, are central to a successful regulatory regime
for mining operations. 175 And, accompanying that right should be the obligation
of the company to submit environmental assessments and plans to aide in the
collection of the data necessary for such determinations. The International
Seabed Authority provides examples of this set of rights and obligations in all
evidence of environmental and social harms associated with that activity. Rather, the contention here is
that, in the absence of adequate legislation and regulation, contracts provide the best available mechanism
for the creation of duties and remedies with respect to such harms. Taken in combination with the recent
push toward contract transparency, contracts have the potential—in comparison to prior historical
moments—of increasing the likelihood of creating “robust, stable, and fair deals.” See What’s the Deal?
Evolving Practices in Contract Transparency, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (June 2018),
https://eiti.org/event/contract-transparency.
174. It is useful to note that New Zealand and Australia are both members of the ISA, and, as
mentioned above, the United States is not. See Member States, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY,
https://www.isa.org.jm/member-states/U (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
175. See generally, Malcolm Clark, et. al., Environmental Impact Assessments for Deep-Sea
Mining: Can We Improve their Future Effectiveness?, 114 MARINE POLICY 103363 (2020)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X18307309.
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three of the major seabed mining regulations, requiring that an environmental
impact assessment be made and submitted before the start of the projects. 176
Additional regulations dictate that after establishing the environmental baselines,
the contractor shall “cooperate with the Authority and the sponsoring State or
States in the establishment and implementation of such monitoring
programme.” 177 New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental
Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act of 2012 (EEZ Act), states as one of its
purposes: “safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of the environment.” 178
Section 39 of the Act details the requirements of the Impact Assessment,
presenting one of the more comprehensive examples of such regulatory
requirements. In completing the Impact Assessment, the Act requires that the
company:
(a) describe the activity (or activities) for which consent is sought; and (b) describe
the current state of the area where it is proposed that the activity will be undertaken
and the environment surrounding the area; and (c) identify persons whose existing
interests are likely to be adversely affected by the activity; and (d) identify the
effects of the activity on the environment and existing interests (including
cumulative effects and effects that may occur in New Zealand or in the sea above or
beyond the continental shelf beyond the outer limits of the exclusive economic
zone); and (e) identify the effects of the activity on the biological diversity and
integrity of marine species, ecosystems, and processes; and (f) identify the effects
of the activity on rare and vulnerable ecosystems and habitats of threatened species;
and (g) describe any consultation undertaken with persons described in paragraph
(c) and specify those persons who have given written approval to the activity; and
(h) include copies of any written approvals to the activity; and (i) specify any
possible alternative locations for, or methods for undertaking, the activity that may
avoid, remedy, or mitigate any adverse effects; and (j) specify the measures that
could be taken to avoid, remedy, or mitigate the adverse effects identified (including
measures that the applicant intends to take). 179

Australia’s Deep Sea Minerals Act implements a condition on exploration
licenses “requiring the holder to take steps to protect the environment of the
licence area, including conditions relating to: (i) protecting wildlife or (ii)
minimising the effect on the environment of the licence area and the area.” 180 In
that same vein, the U.S. Code chapter on deep seabed hard mineral resources
includes provisions, allowing that:
[a]fter issuance or transfer of any license…the Administrator, after consultation with
interested agencies and the licensee…may modify any term, condition, or restriction
in such license [for the following purposes] . . . . If relevant data and other
information (including, but not limited to, data resulting from exploration…activities
under the license) indicate that modification is required to protect the quality of the

176. See Regulation 18, Data and Information To Be Submitted for Approval of the Plan of Work
for Exploration, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY 13, https://isa.org.jm/files/files/documents/isba19c-17_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).
177. Regulation 32, Environmental Baselines and Monitoring, INTERNATIONAL SEABED
AUTHORITY 20 https://isa.org.jm/files/files/documents/isba-19c-17_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).
178. Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act, 10(1) (2012)
(N.Z.), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2012/0072/latest/DLM3956190.html.
179. Id. at 39(1).
180. Offshore Minerals Act, 1994 (Act. No. 28/1994) (Austl.).
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environment or to promote the safety of life and property at sea. 181

The Model Contract reflects the same regulatory goals, adopting an
intensive system for environmental impact assessments and continual
monitoring 182 by defining and detailing processes for a Preliminary Impact
Assessment (PEIA), Preliminary Environmental Management Plan (PEMP) and
a Preliminary Social Management Plan (PSIA). 183
The obligatory assessment and plans include specific benchmarks and
reporting requirements, both automatic and conditional, including that these
preliminary reports and the management plan be submitted to the Ministry of
Lands and Natural Resources at least 90 days prior to the Effective Date. 184 It
also requires that the PEIA and the PSIA be prepared by “an internationally
recognized independent consultant (or consultants), not affiliated with the
Company or any of its principle direct or indirect shareholders . . . .” 185 The
Model Contract goes into specific requirements for each of the plans and reports
including ensuring that the mechanism, in the case of the PEIA will “employ best
practices in order to, at a minimum, identify pre-existing environmental
conditions (a baseline environmental assessment) and set forth the potential
adverse impact of the Prospecting activity and shall take into account all
activities which will be undertaken by the Company in connection with this
Agreement.” 186 In tandem with that, the PEMP is required to:
set forth a reasonable estimate (provided by an environmental consultant not in the
employ of the Company) of the full costs of environmental remediation from the
planned Prospecting and Operations, as well as the full costs of environmental
remediation and restoration that may be required in the event of potential accidents
and unforeseen events. 187

Such explicit obligations provide the Model Contract with important
baselines for enforcement of Company promises to clean up any environmental
harm, providing not only abstract commitments to taking responsibility but also
concrete numbers and an acknowledgement of the extent of harm that could
occur as a result of the project. 188 As environmental harm is of course not the
181. 30 US § 26.1415c(1)(B) (1980).
182. See Ochoa, supra note 160, at sections 4.6, 4.8, 5.4, and 13.
183. Id. at 15-18.
184. Id. at 15.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Provisions such as these are especially important when mining company representatives
make statements that would understandably cause communities to believe the harm to the environment
might be minimal. For example, during Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation
Conference, company representatives made statements that the mineral-rich chimneys might renewable.
Harvey Cook stated that in some areas chimneys can grow quite quickly, such that chimneys could be
harvested now and then re-grown and recollected in 50-100 years, and that this process “might be like
forestation.” See Cook, supra note 17. Similarly, Allison Spalding of the SPC/DSM Project has stated that
drill holes in chimneys might cause a reaction inside the chimneys such that the companies could “grow
the chimneys, even of very high quality.” Spalding also stated that, while chimneys have hundreds of
species living around them, they may be “resilient to disturbances, sometimes in as little as five years.”
She also said that she was not promising that every site would recover in just five years. See Allison
Spalding, Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference
(October 7, 2014) (notes on file with author).
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only risk undertaken in these projects, both ISA regulations 189 and the Model
Contract 190 require that any archeological finds are immediately reported to the
relevant organization.
b. Determining the Company’s Capacity to Fulfill
Obligations
Having established the mechanisms to anticipate and monitor harm, the
best available regulations often then look to determine whether, in light of these
risks, the candidate company is capable of taking on the obligations that come
with those risks. For example, the ISA requires that before starting a project:
[e]ach application for approval of a plan of work for exploration shall contain
specific and sufficient information to enable the Council to determine whether the
applicant is financially and technically capable of carrying out the proposed plan of
work for exploration and of fulfilling its financial obligations to the Authority. 191

Similar language is employed in the Model Contract, which requires that
the Company submit an Initial Feasibility Report “in good faith and in
accordance with International Standards . . . setting out all information known
by the Company as of the Effective Date regarding the Minerals contained within
Prospecting Area and the Company’s financial appraisal of the Prospecting Area
as of the date on which such report is submitted to the Government.” 192 The
Model Contract goes on to stipulate that the Initial Feasibility Report shall
indicate “how the Company proposes to discharge its obligations under the
Mining Law.” 193 In light of the inherent possibility of devastating harm, these
regulations also necessarily include provisions dictating remuneration,
restoration, and remediation for environmental degradation or other adverse
impacts of the project. With these regulations in mind, drafters of seabed mining
contracts can form terms that act as vital safeguards against the risks inherent in
the industry.
c.

Liability and Remedies

When harm, whether social or environmental, does occur, ISA regulations
require that “[a] contractor shall promptly report to the Secretary-General in
writing, using the most effective means, any incident arising from activities
which have caused, are causing or pose a threat of serious harm to the marine
environment.” 194 It goes on to detail the step-by-step process to determine the
appropriate course of action in case of emergencies and requires “the contractor,
prior to the commencement of testing of collecting systems and processing
189. See Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority relating to the
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area,
International Seabed Authority, Regulation 8, 6 (2012), https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fspublic/files/documents/isba-18a-11_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
190. See Ochoa, supra note 160, at para. 5.5.g.
191. International Seabed Authority, supra note 189, at 9.
192. Ochoa, supra note 160, at para. 4.4.a.
193. Id. at 14.
194. International Seabed Authority, supra note 189, at 20.
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operations, will provide the Council with a guarantee of its financial and
technical capability to comply promptly with emergency orders or to assure that
the Council can take such emergency measures.” 195 In this way, these ISA
regulations provide for an emergency response plan that can be efficiently and
effectively deployed by either the Company or the Council as the circumstances
require. Similarly, the Model Contract employs this ISA provision and requires
that:
[i]f Operations violate any requirement referred to [above] or otherwise have
material adverse impact on the environment, the Company shall proceed diligently
to restore the environment to its original and natural state (or to remediate the
negative impact wherever restoration is impossible) and shall take appropriate
preventative measures to avoid further material adverse impact on the
environment. 196

The Model Contract reaffirms the Company’s absolute responsibility for
remedying any harm incurred by the project, stating that, “[n]othing in this
section . . . shall relieve the company of its obligations under section 4.6.d to
procure means to finance the full cost of environmental remediation and
restoration as set forth in that section.” 197 This language is vitally important to
ensure that there is no loophole or source of ambiguity through which the
Company might potentially escape accountability for any harm inflicted by its
Operations. The Model Contract also attempts to incorporate an excellent point
made by participants in Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy
Consultation Conference: if multiple companies are engaged in seabed mining
within a localized space, it may be very difficult or impossible to measure the
impact any one of the companies is having on the marine environment, since
debris and sediment will move with ocean tides and currents. It is important to
establish mechanisms for ascribing harm and liability on a pro-rata or other
shared basis in order to ensure that each party is not able to escape liability,
leaving Vanuatu unprotected. 198
The unsettling truth of enforcement for non-compliance for harm caused
on the part of companies is that outcomes in disputes have historically been likely
to be settled in favor of the company, including in the arbitration context. 199 The
ISA is still in the process of developing draft exploitation regulations to provide
frameworks for liability and enforcement for harm caused in the Area 200 and has
described preliminary plans for enforcement procedures:
195. Id. at 21.
196. Ochoa, supra note 160, at para 12.1.
197. Id. at 28.
198. Joel Simo, Head of the Land and Language Desk of the Vanuatu Cultural Center,
Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference (October 8,
2014) (notes on file with author).
199. Parties to investor-state negotiations often choose an international arbitral tribunal as their
dispute-settlement forum. For recent data on investor-state arbitration, including parties and outcomes,
see Fact Sheet on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases in 2018, IIA ISSUES NOTE, UNCTAD Uni,
United
Nations
Conference
on
Trade
and
Development
(May
2019),
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d4_en.pdf.
200. Draft Exploitation Regulations, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, https://www.isa.org.
jm/mining-code/ongoing-development-regulations-exploitation-mineral-resources-area (last visited July
12, 2020).
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The deep seabed regime anticipates that the Authority will have recourse to a range
of administrative measures that differentiates between the seriousness of the
potential harm and the degree to which the noncomplying behavior is understood to
be intentional. The result is a graduated form of enforcement whereby sanctions will
be preceded by less intrusive measures, such as warnings. 201

The draft also discusses a number of possible frameworks for determining
and enforcing liability for harms caused, noting that “[t]he scheme could operate
at an international level and be overseen by an organ of the Authority or could
be structured as a set of harmonized domestic requirements.” 202
Enforcement and liability measures under a bilateral contract for mineral
extraction within a national EEZ will of course require its own approach. Forumselection and choice-of-law clauses are often vexing in commercial contracts, as
the efficacy of the contract can be greatly affected by these provisions. How
these provisions are drafted will greatly depend on each individual context.
However, it is worth noting that one universally essential element of contract
enforcement, for seabed mining as well as other extractive industries, is
transparency in contract terms. The Model Contract, in Section 22.1, holds that
details of the agreement are not confidential, unless specifically exempted within
the terms of the contract. 203 Transparency alone, however, cannot result in more
favorable outcomes for governments when disputes arise. The substantive
provisions of the contract must be rebalanced as discussed herein such that terms,
if breached, will result in a higher likelihood of favorable outcomes for the
government and the ecosystems and communities it represents.
Intimately connected with the aims of creating a stable and predictable set
of rights and obligations between the parties, is the objective of ensuring that the
valuable contributions of each party to the agreement are fully appreciated.
Royalty rates and other forms of compensation will be addressed at length in the
next section.
2. Second Objective: Recognize Value and Risk
The contract will need to fully appreciate the full picture of potential
benefits, risks and valuable contributions each party to the contract will be
weighing and undertaking. While mining companies may hold the promise of
being able to provide the machinery and technological expertise to access the
mineral wealth on the seabed, that mineral wealth ultimately belongs to the
citizens and governments of each country with jurisdiction over those resources.
At the same time, both parties bear substantial risks. Companies will bear
responsibility to investors or shareholders who have financed mining activity
(including exploration, development, production, and project-end activities),
while governments bear the risk of environmental catastrophes and poor
management of the potential or actual income from mining activity, as well as
201. Neil Craik, Discussion Paper No. 4: Enforcement and Liability Challenges for
Environmental Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, 20 (June
2016), https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Pubs/DPs/DP4.pdf.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Ochoa, supra note 160, at para. 22.1.
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the political risks that will attach to any form of significant mismanagement and
accidents related to the mining activity on the part of the company or the
government. The contract should reflect this reality and assure that the
compensation paid to each party properly reflects the proportional contributions
and potential risks each party bears.
It is common for royalty and tax rates in mining arrangements to be very
low, diminishing the revenue due to the government and available for
deployment to various development objectives. The argument for low royalty
rates is often that the company is taking on such risk in its endeavors that it must
be incentivized to make a long-term, risk-laden investment. The company owns
the machinery, technology, and know-how to convert otherwise inaccessible
mineral wealth into a monetizable commercially viable commodity. Given this
knowledge and technology, the argument continues, the company ought to be
compensated highly for its risk or there will be no incentive to undertake the
activity.
While this is valid, it is also the case that the mineral wealth pertains to the
country and, often, its citizens. And the country, its citizens, and the ecological
systems inside the country take on significant risks when mining activity is
undertaken. In addition, the non-renewable nature of mineral wealth heightens
the risk calculation for a country that has one shot to get the revenue generation
and distribution from mineral extraction right. Once the natural resources are
gone, the country will never have that source of potential revenue again. The
contract must recognize the bilateral nature of both the valuable contributions
each party can make and the risks each party is assuming.
There are a number of tools countries use to take in revenue from mining
operations. Functionally, the body of mechanisms function as taxes on mining
activity, even when they are called royalties, duties or bonus payments, rather
than income taxes or resource rent taxes. Together, these mechanisms are often
referred to as the “fiscal regime” governing mining activity. 204 In addition, the
government may consider requiring a percentage of ownership in the mining
operations. 205
The Model Contract, which was written with Vanuatu in mind, stipulates
that “[t]he Company shall pay the Government a royalty of 30 percent (the
“Royalty Rate”) multiplied by the fair market value of any materials and
Products determined in accordance with this Section . . . (such payment
collectively, the “Royalty”).” 206 This is a significant sum when compared to
industry norms regarding royalties paid to countries in traditional mining
contracts. However, to understand this significant deviation from royalty rates
seen in other contexts, one must recall that Vanuatu has a corporate income tax
rate of 0.00%. 207 By comparison, the corporate income tax rate for Oceania was
204. NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 65.
205. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, MINING ROYALTIES AND
OTHER MINING TAXES: A SUMMARY OF RATES AND RULES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (2012), 5.
206. Ochoa, supra note 160, at 38.
207. Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG, https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-toolsand-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2020).
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28.43% in 2019 and the OECD average was 23.23%. 208 With corporate income
tax currently an impossible vehicle for revenue generation, the royalty rate must
be significantly higher than might otherwise be the norm. 209 This type of
arrangement is at least facially consistent with the statements of one company
representative at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy
Consultation Conference that included accounts of Nautilus Minerals’ intentions
of “looking to equitably share the benefit with the people of PNG” (referring to
the Solwara 1 Project referenced above). 210
In countries with corporate income tax rates in the range of 25-35%, it is
common to see royalty rates in the range of 2-5%. 211 However, in the context of
a 0% income tax, a country expecting to share in the revenue from mining
operations will necessarily require a much higher royalty rate on the minerals
extracted from their seabed. 212 Indeed, it is common to see higher royalty rates
in countries with lower corporate income tax rates. 213 In general, “[a] corporate
income tax is a standard element of every mining fiscal regime.” 214
Many countries are now involved in a general trend to increase royalty
rates, and the Model Contract assumes countries undertaking this novel and risky
activity will adopt modernized revenue models that include higher royalty
rates. 215 One advantage of setting forth the fiscal regime in the contract between
the parties is the possibility of embedding stability agreements with respect to
the fiscal arrangements in the contract. 216
The Model Contract is also crafted around the recognition of the finite
nature of the resources being exploited and the value that they hold for
development of important infrastructure 217 and educational opportunities in the
country and the risks that mining the minerals presents to the country. For
example, the Model Contract requires that “[t]he Company shall (and the
Company will require any other contractors or subcontractors to) employ and
give preference to the employment of qualified citizens of Vanuatu . . . it being
the objective of the parties as soon as is practicable that the Operations under this
208. Id.
209. Vanuatu does impose a value added tax, but a VAT is unhelpful to a country like Vanuatu
in the seabed mining context. It is expected that the material extracted from the seabed will be shipped to
Australia or China for processing and will not be consumed or processed in Vanuatu. See Spalding, supra
note 188.
210. Paul Eagleson, Manager for Exploration and Polymetalic Nodules, Nautilus Minerals,
Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference (October 8,
2014) (notes on file with author).
211. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 205, at 11-12.
212. The royalty rate would be based on an international reference price for arms-length
transactions (to address transfer pricing difficulties) that is established by independent markets. Whether
the royalty rate would be measured at the mining site or at the processing site is left to be established.
Whether the royalties would be set on a sliding scale to account for changes in the productivity of the
mine and whether the royalty will be fixed would also need to be determined. See also NATURAL
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 70.
213. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 205, at 11-12.
214. NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 73.
215. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 205, at 3.
216. See Id. at 6 for additional information on tax stability agreements.
217. This seems consistent with the position Nautilus Minerals, for example, took in PNG, where
the company agreed to build two new bridges. See Eagleson, supra note 210.
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Agreement should be conducted and managed primarily by citizens of
Vanuatu.” 218 Further, training for citizens for “financial, accounting,
supervisory, managerial, executive positions” is required as are services and
infrastructure to ensure the health and safety of those employees. 219 It also
includes a provision for educational funding for Ni-Vanuatu people to pursue
education in the fields of mining, geology, engineering, law, medicine, finance,
development or other related disciplines. 220
In addition to ensuring that adequate revenue is making its way back to the
country whose resources are being exploited, it is important that the profits
received are being invested in the country’s people and infrastructure, rather than
syphoned off by elites. This is yet another instance in which the transparency of
contract terms, in this case revenues, is especially important. Industry wide
initiatives and systems of accountability serve important roles in ensuring that
the fruits of extractive industry are shared with the communities most impacted
by the activity. An apt example of this can be found in the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative’s objectives:
that a country’s natural resources belong to its citizens, the EITI has established a
global standard to promote the open and accountable management of oil, gas and
mineral resources. The EITI Standard requires the disclosure of information along
the extractive industry value chain from the point of extraction, to how revenues
make their way through the government, and how they benefit the public. By doing
so, the EITI seeks to strengthen public and corporate governance, promote
understanding of natural resource management, and provide the data to inform
reforms for greater transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. In each
of the 53 implementing countries, the EITI is supported by a coalition of
government, companies, and civil society. 221

Just as companies are more likely to commit to equitable terms when they
are made public, so too are countries more likely to ensure that revenues from
extractive industries are distributed and invested to promote socially equitable
ends. 222 Section 22.1 of the Model Contract asserts that:
The Government or the Company may, and the Government expects to, make public
information relating to the timing and amount of Royalties and other payments
specifically due or paid under the terms of this agreement and of Taxes and Duties
payable or paid by the Company and the rates at which Royalties, Taxes and Duties
or other payments become due or are assessed. 223

218. Ochoa, supra note 160, at 32. This seems consistent with the position Nautilus Minerals, for
example, took in PNG, where as of October 2016, company representatives stated that 20% of Nautilus
workforce in PNG was made up of PNG nationals. See Eagleson, supra note 210.
219. Id. at 33.
220. Id. It is common for countries to require social contributions of this sort from mining
operations. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 205.
221. Who We Are: The EITI is the Global Standard to Promote the Open and Accountable
Management of Extractive Resources, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
https://eiti.org/who-we-are (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
222. See EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, PROGRESS REPORT 5 (2020),
https://eiti.org/files/documents/eiti_progress_report_2020_english.pdf (discussing the impact that
“publishing information that matters to citizens” can have on that can efforts to “close avenues for
corruption”); see also OXFAM, supra note 169.
223. Ochoa, supra note 160, at 51.
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This provision serves to reinforce the values of transparency and to ensure
that both parties acknowledge the importance and permissibility of making
revenue flows and related processes public information.
3. Third Objective: Accurately Reflect Promises
This section observes that FPIC is viewed as the requisite process through
which to arrive at a locally driven decision to permit or not permit mining
activity. In the most critical light, FPIC is seen more skeptically as the process
by which a local population grants mining companies the social license to
operate. Whether viewed as a strong or a weak process, it is uniformly seen as
process only. But this view fails to see the process as an important part of contract
negotiations. The FPIC process itself is rich in content that should inform mining
contracts. During the FPIC process, all stakeholders are presenting their hopes,
concerns, and expectations about the likely harms and benefits that will result
from the mining activity. Companies make a robust set of representations about
the likely economic and development benefits that will result from mining
activity, as well as about the likelihood of environmental, social, and cultural
harms. Communities, on the other hand, make clear their own hopes and
expectations with respect to mining activity. The objective, from the company’s
side, is to provide the information necessary to derive the community’s consent.
The community’s objective is to make clear the terms on which that consent was
granted.
It would be reasonable for communities that have granted their consent to
seabed mining to believe that the terms, conditions, and demands they
established during the FPIC process would govern the behavior of the
government and the company during the life of the contract. This is highly
unlikely, however, unless those terms are explicitly drafted into the four corners
of the contract. As noted above, under the common law contract doctrine on parol
evidence, even parties in privity of contract are usually unable to present
extrinsic evidence that shows ambiguities, clarifies or adds terms to the express
language of the contract. In other words, the representations of the companies or
the government during an FPIC process may have little to no legal value unless
those terms are expressly drafted into the language of the license agreement. This
is especially true when the admitted terms can be categorized as future promises.
Although the rule provides exceptions for “accident, fraud, or mistake of fact,”
allowing for evidence of foul play that may be admitted in certain cases, there is
a significant level of ambiguity as to when fraud or duress can be shown to
trigger an override of the rule. 224 Promises and informal agreements on which
the consent of the community is based are especially crucial in negotiations for
mining contracts. However, these types of statements in negotiations are often
considered by courts to fall short of triggering an exception to the rule:
It is doubtless true that where the alleged fraud consists merely in promises which
are not fulfilled, or statements as to future events, the courts are less inclined to infer
224. Parol-Evidence Rule; Right to Show Fraud in Inducement or Execution of Written Contract,
56 A.L.R. 13 (1928).
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a fraudulent intent than when the statements relate to a present or pre-existing fact.
If one makes a statement regarding an event to take place in the future, obviously the
statement should ordinarily be regarded merely as an expression of opinion, and the
courts will frequently stop at this point and hold that such a statement cannot serve
as a basis on which to predicate fraud. 225

Thus, all essential prior agreements must be included in writing in the
completed contract’s terms in order to ensure that the promises that conditioned
consent will be legally enforceable. For this reason, it is crucial that contract
drafters be identified in anticipation of the FPIC process and incorporate the
representations, expectations, and conditions on which the FPIC process was
based into the express language of the contract. There is simply no other way to
assure that community expectations will be legally enforceable. 226 The Model
Contract was drafted to reflect both the promises made by the Company and the
demands and expectations of the people of Vanuatu expressed during the
preliminary negotiations and public hearings.
4. Fourth Objective: Embed State of the Art Environmental
Management
In order to reflect the proceedings during the initial consultation, the
license agreement must be informed by Ecology Management Theory and
Emerging Development Theory (precautionary principle, adaptive management,
well-being approach). Each were central to the National Consultation held in
October 2014 in Port Vila and must be incorporated in the contract to reflect the
intention and understanding of the parties and to assure they are legally
enforceable conditions, rather than hortatory aspirations.
a. Ecology Management Approach
An ecology management approach to development is an ecocentric
approach, which incorporates ecology and conservation principles into
frameworks for sustainable development. 227 Traditional approaches to
development are often categorized by their anthropocentric nature,
“characterized by the notion of human exceptionalism, [viewing] [h]umans,
unlike other species [as] exempt from the constraints of nature, and the whole of

225. Promises and Statements as to Future Events as Fraud, 51 A.L.R. 46 (1927).
226. During Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference, for
example, company and SPC/DSM representatives made statements indicating that seabed mining would
likely be a significant source of revenue for Vanuatu, that there would be very little waste and tailings
from the activity, that seabed mining would need to use the best available technology, including “every
possible measure to minimize the impacts on the environment,” and would need to apply the precautionary
principle and adaptive management process to the activity. See Spalding, supra note 188. See also, Cook,
supra note 17; Eagleson, supra note 210.
227. This type of ecological management was called for by NGO representatives during
Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference. See, e.g., Mareen Penjueli,
Coordinator of the Pacific Network on Globalization (PANG), Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National
Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference, (October 7-9, 2014) (notes on file with author).
Penjueli called for prioritizing indigenous peoples’ relationship to the ocean rather than a relatively novel
commodification of the ocean. She also insisted on the need to protect the interests of indigenous
communities.
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nature [as existing] primarily for human use, with no inherent value of its
own.” 228 In contrast, an “ecocentric perspective” on development is
“characterized by the belief that ecosystems have inherent worth for maintaining
planetary homeostasis and all life. [This approach] reflects notions of holism,
integration, and synthesis, according to which human cultural systems must
function within the safe operating limits dictated by ecosystems.” 229
Ecocentric approaches don’t preclude considerations of human need and
development, but rather they seek to address those needs while avoiding “the
most worrying aspect [of anthropocentric approaches, namely] that there seems
to be no overall survival plan.” 230 Anthropocentrism and ecocentrism do not
represent a dichotomy, but rather they are poles on a spectrum of approaches
that, when properly harnessed, can be used to develop “transformational
strategies” 231 that incorporate understanding across disciplines to create effective
management approaches that promote social and ecological good. 232
Critiques of an ecocentric approach to development mainly center on an
alleged inherent valuing of environmental conservation over human well-being.
Yet just the opposite is often true. Looking to the example of Vanuatu, it is clear
that the well-being and happiness of its communities is intricately connected to
the well-being of the surrounding ecosystems. In the last publication of the
Happy Planet Index in 2016, Vanuatu ranked 4th out of 140 countries when
measuring the happiness of its people, and it has consistently ranked among the
happiest countries, taking the top spot in 2006. 233
In 2019, the British Broadcasting Corporation conducted a short
documentary on the topic in which a local man explains the high rates of
happiness on the islands as “a consequence of how respectful [Ni-Vanuatu] are
with the nature; how we manage the land, how we manage the water.” 234 A local
artist contributes that people own the land and have consistent access to growing
and gathering food, and the resulting freedom from reliance on money is a core
explanation of the high levels of satisfaction. 235 The documentary goes on to
highlight that “most people in Vanuatu can access healthy sea and forest
resources.” 236 As a result, examples of an ecology management approach can be
228. Helen Borland, et al., Building Theory at the Intersection of Ecological Sustainability and
Strategic Management, 135 J. BUS. ETHICS 293, 295 (2014), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/
10.1007%2Fs10551-014-2471-6.pdf.
229. Id. at 296.
230. Id. at 295.
231. Id. at 305.
232. This type of approach is highlighted, for example, by asking how communities in Vanuatu
could adequately and holistically be compensated for loss of food sources, cultural values, and the social
security that comes from intact communities. See Francis Hickey, Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National
Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference (October 8, 2014) (notes on file with author). In
asking this question, Hickey was asking audience members to be skeptical about the ability of cash
payments to ever be wholly adequate.
233. Vanuatu, HAPPY PLANET INDEX (2016), http://happyplanetindex.org/countries/vanuatu (last
visited Nov. 1, 2020).
234. Why is this country one of the happiest places on earth? BBC: REEL (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/reel/video/p07pr9sw/why-is-this-country-one-of-the-happiest-places-on-earth-.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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found in the Model Contract’s implementation of processes in line with the
precautionary principle and adaptive management approach such as requiring
environmental impact assessments and a preliminary environmental
management plan to prevent potential adverse impacts and provide for any
necessary remediation. 237
An ecocentric management theory is complemented by other emerging
theories of development centered on social and environmental values and which
prioritize sustainable development for the host country over the economic gain
of private parties. These previously discussed doctrines include the
precautionary principle, adaptive management, and the well-being approach, and
they present alternative perspectives on development that emphasize equity,
community engagement and sustainable practices. Each of these theories, along
with an ecology management approach, will be further developed below with
examples of their application in the Model Contract.
b. Well-being Approach
Vanuatu’s National Sustainable Development Plan and the Model Contract
both provide examples of an ecocentric approach to development in which the
well-being of the people of Vanuatu and its future generations are given the
highest priority. The Development Plan affirms the country’s commitment to
maintaining “a pristine natural environment on land and at sea serving [its
people’s] food, cultural, economic, and ecological needs” in recognition of the
vital role of ecological stability as “fundamental to [the] well-being and
prosperity” of the Ni-Vanuatu people. 238 Applied in tandem with an ecocentric
approach, the well-being approach provides a more holistic understanding of the
human experience of development and its widespread impacts. The well-being
approach to development “goes beyond a narrow focus on policy or programme
objectives to comprehend the real impact on people’s lives,” 239 responding to
“the need to move beyond a sole or primary emphasis on economic growth as
the marker of progress.” 240 The Model Contract applies a well-being approach
through its requirements for social services, local hiring, and educational
funding, 241 and additional terms, such as relatively high royalty rates, 242 that
center the prosperity and well-being of the Ni-Vanuatu people over efficiency
and profit. Given the central role of the surrounding ecosystems to the happiness
and well-being of communities on the islands discussed at length in the previous
section, it is of vital importance that approaches to development in Vanuatu
incorporate understandings of the interconnected nature of the well-being of the
Ni-Vanuatu people and the surrounding environment.
237. See Ochoa, supra note 160, at 15-18.
238. Vanuatu Department of Strategic Policy, Planning, and Aid Coordination, Vanuatu 2030:
The People’s Plan: National Sustainable Development Plan 2016 to 2030, 5 (2016).
239. Sarah C. White, Wellbeing, Governance and Social Development Research Center (July
2015), https://gsdrc.org/professional-dev/wellbeing/.
240. Id.
241. See Ochoa, supra note 160, at 32-33.
242. Id. at 38.
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The Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle is another necessary element of a sustainable
and equitable development regime. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development incorporated the principle positing that “[i]n
order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.” 243 The preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity affirms
this commitment, holding: “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss
of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.” 244
In the Model Contract, the precautionary principle (or approach) is the
foundation on which all other contract terms are built: “The Government and the
Company both recognize that seabed mining is novel activity, the benefits and
effects of which little is known, requiring all provisions of this agreement to be
consistent with adaptive management approaches and the Precautionary
Principle.” 245 The precautionary approach is defined in the Model Contract as
“employing caution in the context of uncertainty and anticipating harm before it
occurs . . . [meaning] that Prospecting shall not be undertaken if substantial
evidence indicates the risk of serious harm to the marine environment.” 246 The
viability of the seabed mining industry is hotly contested, with many arguing that
the proper application of the precautionary principle demands a moratorium on
seabed mining, there being too much unknown and too much at stake. However,
under current international regulatory regimes, each country ultimately has the
right to decide whether to place a moratorium on these types of activities within
its sovereign territory. If countries, informed of the unknowable and potentially
disastrous nature of the risks of seabed mining to some of their most valuable
resources and ecosystems, decide to engage in the activity, the role of contracts
and regulatory systems that incorporate the precautionary principle and an
adaptive management approach (as demonstrated by the above excerpts from the
Model Contract) is of vital importance to avoiding the most devastating of harms
and ensuring accountability for the harms that do occur. 247
243. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992 31 ILM 874 (1992).
244. Convention on Biological Diversity, Feb. 8, 2007.
245. Ochoa, supra note 160, at 2.
246. Id. at 7. A number of representatives at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy
Consultation Conference indicated the importance of the precautionary principle in the seabed mining
context. See, e.g., Spalding, supra note 188; Rose Koian, Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National Deep
Sea Minerals Policy Consultation (October 8, 2014) (notes on file with author); Maureen Penjueli.
Presentation at Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation (October 8, 2014) (notes
on file with author). See also photos of posters created by discussion groups at the conclusion of the
conference, in which participants indicated the importance of the precautionary principle to any
consideration of seabed mining (on file with author).
247. For countries that decide to pursue seabed mining, even in light of the risks, the Model
Contract can provide a number of concrete examples for how the parties’ stated commitments to a
precautionary approach is to be implemented once operations are underway, including in Section 12,
“Environmental Protection and Management,” which provides that, “If Operations . . . have material
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d. Adaptive Management Approach
An adaptive management approach to development centers on “improving
resource management by learning from management outcomes . . . [by]
exploring alternative ways to meet management objectives, predicting the
outcomes of alternatives based on the current state of knowledge, implementing
one or more of these alternatives, monitoring to learn about the impacts of
management actions, and then using the results to update knowledge and adjust
management actions.” 248 Adaptive management allows for contract terms that
respond to the realities of operations that are steeped in unknown and
unknowable risks by incorporating measures that allow for halting operations in
order to reassess the risks and benefits of the project. 249 Adaptive management,
along with the precautionary principle, was the most widely advocated form of
environmental management during Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals
Policy Consultation Conference. For example, company representatives
advocated for a “baby steps approach” that would allow for assessing impacts
along the way and measuring every step carefully in order to develop the world’s
best practice. 250 Similarly, governmental and SPC/DSM representatives
suggested the possibility of an adaptive management approach, asking, for
example, whether seabed mining can be undertaken in stages and where
governments could restrict the scope or stop the activity based on the emergence
of unexpected or undesirable consequences. 251
Vanuatu’s National Sustainable Development Plan outlines the country’s
development aspirations including: “[m]aintaining a pristine natural
environment on land and at sea that serves [the island’s] food, cultural,
economic, and ecological needs . . . [and a] stable economy based on equitable,
sustainable growth, that creates jobs and income-earning opportunities
accessible to all people in rural and urban areas.” 252 The cultural, social,
adverse impacts on the environment, the Company shall proceed diligently to restore the environment to
its original and natural state (or to remediate the negative impact where restoration is impossible) and
shall take appropriate preventative measures to avoid further material adverse impact on the
environment.” Section 13, “Updating the PEIA and the PEMP, and Other Environmental Matters,”
requires that the Company update environmental impact and risk assessments “to reflect the actual status
of Operations at the time” and that Operations cease during any environmental restoration or remediation
as required. Ochoa, supra note 160, at 35-37.
248. BYRON K. WILLIAMS, ET. AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, 1 (2009).
249. Many of the most well-developed regulatory regimes for seabed mining have explicitly
adopted the adaptive management approach. New Zealand’s submission to the ISA affirms its
commitment to an adaptive management approach to seabed mining:
the New Zealand Government sees adaptive management as a structured, iterative process of
o u
o
k
o u
,
o
u
u
o
time through system monitoring and adapting management practices in response to what has
been learnt. The challenge in using adaptive management lies in finding the correct balance
k o
o
o
uu
o
term outcome, including appropriate environmental protection, based on current knowledge.
The New Zealand Government, Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand’s Experiences with Adaptive
Management for Seabed Mining Projects, 7 (2016) www.mfe.govt.nz.
250. Cook, supra note 17.
251. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 114; Spalding, supra note 188.
252. Vanuatu Department of Strategic Policy, Planning, and Aid Coordination, supra note 238,
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economic, and democratic value of a stable ecosystem and climate is consistently
emphasized throughout the Development Plan, highlighting the intersections of
ecocentric management, the precautionary principle, adaptive management
principles and the well-being approach necessary for sustainable development in
the country in accordance with the will of its people.
The Model Contract is structured around these values, reflecting them in
many of its definitions and terms. For example, in Section 12 on “Environmental
Protection and Management,” it is reaffirmed that the agreement “is intended and
at all times should be interpreted to be consistent with and to give effect to the
Precautionary Approach and the Adaptive Management Approach in all aspects
of Prospecting and Operations.” 253 The Section then goes on to require that the
Company conduct its operations in compliance with “all applicable Law” and a
number of guidelines, standards, and best practices for the industry, requiring
that “[t]he Company shall take appropriate preventative measures to protect all
water bodies wholly or partially within and bordering Vanuatu, all dry land
surfaces, and the atmosphere from pollution, contamination or damage resulting
from Operations.” 254 The section further provides that:
If Operations violate any requirement referred to [above] or otherwise have material
adverse impact on the environment, the Company shall proceed diligently to restore
the environment to its original and natural state (or to remediate the negative impact
where restoration is impossible) and shall take appropriate preventative measures to
avoid further material adverse impact on the environment. 255

As the above sections demonstrate, the Model Contract, through its
incorporation of the precautionary principle and the adaptive management
approach, tailors the agreement to serve the well-being of the people of Vanuatu
as defined by the people themselves in the Development Plan, and to protect their
interests from as much harm as possible in the face of the known, unknown, and
unknowable risks inherent in the contested practice of seabed mining. 256
Together, ecocentric approaches to management theory, adaptive
management, the precautionary principle, and the well-being approach present
an emerging theory of development with equitable principles, community wellbeing, and sustainable development at its heart. As discussed above, traditional
mining contracts expose the exploitative nature of agreements that often leave
the local community with little to show for the project beyond environmental
degradation. A commitment to implementing these theories of management is an
essential element of contract drafting for exploitative industries, as well as to
build on and improve the seabed mining regulations promulgated in the 1970s

at 4.
253. Ochoa, supra note 160, at 35.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. It is important to note, as Richard Johnson, Malcolm Clark and Francis Hickey each
emphasized during Vanuatu’s First National Deep Sea Minerals Policy Consultation Conference, that the
adaptive management approach depends on good information about the baseline conditions of the water,
flora, fauna, and other conditions of the ecosystem prior to the activity being undertaken. This is
information that is incomplete right now. See Johnson, supra note 114; Clark, supra note 148; Hickey,
supra note 232.
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and 1980s, as they provide adaptive and intentional frameworks in which to build
agreements that will be representative of, and responsive to, the needs of the
ecosystems and communities most impacted by the project.
CONCLUSION
While much has been written over the past decades about the prospect of
deep sea mining in international waters, relatively little attention has been
devoted to the prospect of seabed mining within the national territories of
individual nations. Although the seabed falling within the jurisdiction of
UNCLOS is vast, far more attention must be devoted to the governance regimes
pertaining to seabed mining within the jurisdiction of individual countries and
the governance regimes that regulate such mining. 257 Experimental seabed
mining companies have secured licenses to explore nearly four times the oceanic
territory within national jurisdictions than outside of national domains.
Because of their proximity to the hydrothermal vent fields that hold the
promise of very valuable minerals, countries in the South Pacific find themselves
grappling with the prospect of becoming the first sites of seabed mining. Few of
these countries have significant experience with land-based mining, and none
has any experience whatsoever with seabed mining. As a result, they lack the
constitutional structures, legislative landscape, and administrative capacity to
adequately regulate this high-risk activity. 258 Still, some Pacific Island countries
are considering seabed mining, and some have already issued licenses for
exploration of exploitation of the seabed within their jurisdiction. 259 In addition
to lacking adequate governance structures to address seabed mining, many of
these countries are unprepared to grapple with the potential impacts the mining
will have on the natural environment and the communities that rely on the ocean
for their sustenance and well-being. 260 While it may be advisable to place
moratoria on seabed mining until such legal and social support systems are in
place, not all countries have chosen this path.
The license agreement governing any seabed mining must provide the vital
infrastructure to assure that countries and their communities are able to realize
the promises of economic development, while also protecting the natural
environment. This is especially necessary for countries with new or weaker
governance regimes. Recent scholarship analyzing land-based mining contracts
helps to illuminate best practices for establishing strong, stable, and respectful
257. See generally, Tomoko Kakee, Deep-Sea Mining Legislation in Pacific Island Countries:
From the Perspective of Public Participation in Approval Procedures, 117 MARINE POL. 103881 (2020).
258. For an overview of the environmental and social impacts of seabed mining, see Julian Aguon
& Julie Hunter, Second Wave Due Diligence: The Case for Incorporating Free, Prior, and Informed
Consent into the Deep Sea Mining Regulatory Regime, 38 STAN. ENV. L.J. 3 (2018).
259. See BLUE OCEAN LAW & PACIFIC NETWORK ON GLOBALIZATION, RESOURCE ROULETTE:
HOW DEEP SEA MINING AND INADEQUATE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS IMPERIAL THE PACIFIC AND ITS
PEOPLES, 10-17 (2016). Papua New Guinea has issued exploitation licenses as well; see supra notes 2429 and accompanying text.
260. BLUE OCEAN LAW & PACIFIC NETWORK ON GLOBALIZATION, supra note 259. See also Julie
Hunter, Pradeep Singh & Julian Aguon, Broadening Common Heritage: Addressing the Gaps in the Deep
Sea Mining Regulatory Regime, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 16, 2018),
http://harvardelr.com/2018/04/16/broadening-common-heritage/.
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relationships between mining companies and the countries where they operate.
Any contracts developed in the context of seabed mining should adopt the best
available practices, especially given the high-risk nature of this novel activity.
Among other objectives, the contracts must assure that while compensating
mining companies for their risk and technology, they also adequately
compensate the countries for economic, social, and environmental risks as well
as the valuable resources hidden below the sea. Such contracts must also
recognize that any social license to operate has been attained because of promises
made to the government and to communities. 261 These promises concern
economic gains that will accrue to the government, the social projects that will
be undertaken by companies, the employment and infrastructure that will
accompany the projects (or that might be built because of them), and the
importance the companies claim with respect to environmental protection. To
have legal effect, these promises must be embedded into the four corners of the
contract. Finally, given the projected risks of environmental harm from seabed
mining, the contracts must embed strong environmental management regimes
into their terms.
This Article was inspired and informed by fieldwork in Vanuatu. When
that country entered into its initial license agreements, Vanuatu had no seabed
mining legislation, and the licenses were insufficiently detailed, consequential,
or enforceable. The author was engaged by Vanuatu to provide advice on the
contractual aspects of seabed mining and provided advice and consultation,
including in the form of a Model Contract to which this Article has referred
throughout. 262 The Model Contract was designed to serve as a basis for
negotiation toward a robust contract with seabed mining companies requesting
access to Vanuatu’s seabed minerals. Since then, Vanuatu has not entered into
any new license agreements—indeed the Prime Minister of Vanuatu recently
supported a call for a 10-year moratorium. 263 Still, the insights of the Model
Contract and other existing resources regarding best available practices for
mining contracts provide a vital resource for governments considering cautiously
venturing into seabed mining within their territories.
Students of contracts are often taught that a contract is only as good as its
enforcement. In the context of seabed mining, as in every other contractual
situation, the enforcement of the contract is an essential component to assuring
recovery in the event of breach. Even a party who ultimately suffers grave harm
from their contracting partner can never be assured ex ante of recovery. Still,
contracts possess other valuable capacities. The process of contract drafting and
negotiating, the insistence on incorporating promises made during the
consultation process, and the act of good governance demonstrated by making

261. See Colin Filer & Jennifer Gabriel, How Could Nautilus Minerals Gain the Social License
to Operate the World’s First Deep Sea Mine? 95 MARINE POL. 394 (2018) (discussing the difficulties in
defining the communities and “negotiation space” from which seabed mining companies must attempt to
extract social licenses to operate); Cook, McConachy, & Egden, supra note 157.
262. Ochoa, supra note 160.
263. Doherty, supra note 25.
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the contract a public document, 264 all serve significant performance and
enforcement functions. If governments pursue seabed mining, such contracts
will help to provide the essential legal infrastructure necessary to protect
countries, communities, and ecosystems.

264. Some terms may be redacted to ensure that intellectual property and corporate secrets (such
as the precise location of mineral finds) are protected.

